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In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Voting
Rights Act’s preclearance requirements for six states’ voting laws, and
many of those states almost immediately enacted new voting restrictions,
that disparately affected citizens of color. In the 1980s and 1990s,
Congress deregulated financial markets, including dismantling
protections that had been in place since the New Deal, allowing firms to
introduce new forms of derivatives—and systemic risk—into the economy,
leading to 2008’s housing crisis. In the early 21st century, state
legislatures increasingly enacted exemptions from state vaccination
requirements that allowed parents to skip their children’s vaccinations,
setting the stage for resurgences of measles in 2015 and 2019. Since at
least 2001, courts, federal agencies, citizens, and NGOs have focused on
the Clean Water Act’s alleged intrusions into state sovereignty and private
property rights in the context of “dredge and fill” permits, undermining
the Act’s continuing ability to improve the overall quality of the nation’s
waterbodies.
All of these seemingly unrelated legal phenomena derive, at least in
part, from the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome.
In 1995, Dr. Daniel Pauly described the “shifting baseline syndrome”
and its problems for fisheries management. Pauly posited that each
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generation of fishers and fisheries managers forgets what the ocean and
its fisheries used to be, instead taking the current state—demonstrably
impoverished from a historical perspective—as normal. The forgetting of
history, in other words, makes opaque what the goals of fisheries
regulation should be, or even could be.
This Article brings the shifting baseline concept into public law,
identifying for the first time a regulatory shifting baseline syndrome that
can undermine the law’s ability to protect society at large. This syndrome
arises when a long-existing public legal regime so successfully eliminates
a societal problem that citizens, politicians, and lawmakers forget that the
regime is in fact still working to keep that problem at bay. The syndrome
is especially problematic in areas of public law where curbing human
behavioral tendencies remains an important component of protecting
public goods, benefits, or amenities, regardless of how secure the relevant
public commons now appears. Acknowledging the syndrome thus
challenges would-be law reformers to ask whether we should recover the
historical lessons about ourselves and our collective abilities to harm
society at large before dismantling the legal protections prior generations
felt compelled to enact.
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And you, of tender years,
Can’t know the fears,
That your elders grew by.
-- Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young, “Teach Your Children”

INTRODUCTION

ev

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
Studying history is necessary to avoid repeating past mistakes.
-- George Santayana
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In June 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, a five-Justice majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the historical underpinnings of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, holding unconstitutional the Act’s mandate that some states (and only some
states) seek federal permission before enacting voting laws (“preclearance
requirements”).1 According to the Court majority, times have changed:
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There is no denying . . . that the conditions that originally justified
these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions. By 2009, “the racial gap in voter registration and
turnout [was] lower in the States originally covered by § 5 than it
[was] nationwide.” Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that
African–American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter
turnout in five of the six States originally covered by § 5, with a gap
in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent.2
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The issue for the Court was not whether voting discrimination still existed; the
majority admitted that it did.3 Rather, “The question is whether the Act’s
extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States, continue to
satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short time ago, ‘the Act imposes
current burdens and must be justified by current needs.’”4
The Shelby County Court had decided to tussle with the regulatory shifting
baseline syndrome. The Justices’ split, moreover, underscores the importance of
public regulatory regimes as cultural memory institutions.
In 1995, Dr. Daniel Pauly described the “shifting baseline syndrome” and the

1

Pr

Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013) (referencing Voting Rights Act of 1965,
§§ 4, 5, formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c, now 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303, 10304).
2
Id. at 535 (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203–
204 (2009)).
3
Id. at 536.
4
Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 203).
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problems it causes for fisheries management.5 Pauly argued that each generation of
fishers and fisheries managers forgets what the ocean and its fisheries used to
sustain, instead taking the current abundance and size of desired fish—however
demonstrably impoverished those might be from a historical perspective—as
normal.6 As a result, fisheries management, laws, and policies never seek to restore
fisheries and marine ecosystems to true health, but instead accept and adjust to
progressively worsening ecological conditions.7 The forgetting of history, in other
words, makes opaque what the goals of regulation should be, or even could be. In
fisheries regulation and other forms of species and ecosystem management,
therefore, reconstructing historical ecological conditions has become the means of
correcting the shifting baseline syndrome.8
This Article moves the shifting baseline syndrome into public law,9 arguing that
successful regulatory regimes can actually cause a shifting baseline syndrome—the
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. This syndrome arises when the laws created
to correct a particular societal problem are so successful that, after some time
passes, citizens, politicians, courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures forget
that that regulatory regime is in fact still functioning. The syndrome thus distorts
public estimation of the regime’s continuing existential value, potentially inducing
courts, legislatures, and agencies to weaken, dismantle, or eliminate it.
Given its society-wide function, public law ought to serve as a form of cultural
memory or memory institution, a record of why a community has legally protected
itself in the ways that it has. “Memory institutions are social entities that select,
document, contextualize, preserve, index, and thus canonize elements of
humanity’s culture, historical narratives, [and] individual[] and collective

5
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Daniel Pauly, Anecdotes and The Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Fisheries, 10 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY
& EVOLUTION 430, 430 (1995).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See discussion infra Part I.
9
“Public law,” for purposes of this discussion, refers to the statutes, regulations, and policies that
both regulate government itself and operate to protect society as a whole from problems that arise
at scales too large to deal with effectively through private law mechanisms, such as contracting,
insurance, or tort liability. Scholars generally distinguish “public law” from “private law” either on
the basis that public law involves and regulates the government itself, see, e.g., David Sloss,
Polymorphic Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law
Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757, 1767-68 (2014); Ryan J. Cassidy, Prefatory Remarks:
Administrative Law and the First Annual Survey, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 617, 621-22 (1996), or on
the basis of the law’s subject matter. See, e.g., Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law
Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 261, 300-304 (1999) (noting
that “private law and public law are defined according to the categories or types of law traditionally
within each: private law traditionally includes contracts, torts, property, and family law, while public
law traditionally includes antitrust, securities, exchange controls, and most economic regulation”).
This Article embraces both inflections of “public law” but relies more heavily on the latter,
extending McConnaughay’s emphasis on “public law's focus on the public interest and preventing
public harm,” id. at 302, to public health law and environmental and natural resources law.
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memories.”10 Traditional and paradigmatic memory institutions include archives,
museums, and libraries; more contemporary additions include the various
“networked memory institutions” of the internet and social media.11 However,
statutes and regulatory regimes, together with the histories of their creation, are also
memory institutions.12
Unfortunately, the status of public legal regimes as memory institutions is
underappreciated, particularly within the law itself.13 To be sure, examination of
statutory purpose remains a bedrock touchstone of statutory interpretation, and
courts continue to examine statutory history14 and even legislative history15 in the
process. However, the process of statutory construction occurs within the regulatory
regime itself and assumes that regime’s continued legitimacy. The cultural memory
at issue in this Article, in contrast, operates at a higher scale, informing not (or not
just) what the particular instruments (laws, regulations) mean but rather their
continuing value to society. Indeed, the very existence of public laws on a particular
subject should remind citizens, politicians, judges, and legislators that there was in
fact a historical problem that might recur if the correcting regulatory regime does
not remain in place.
10

Pr

ep

rin

tn

ot

pe

Guy Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization and Its
Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 73 (2008) (citing ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTS AND
INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL MEMORY: ESSAYS FROM THE SAWYER SEMINAR (Francis X. Blouin, Jr. &
William G. Rosenberg eds., 2006); REPRESENTING THE NATION: A READER—HISTORIES, HERITAGE
AND MUSEUMS (David Boswell & Jessica Evans eds., 1999).
11
Id.
12
Notably, the European Union is dealing with the opposite problem in the form of so-called
“memory laws,” which seek to reify a particular interpretation or perspective on history. Thus,
“‘Memory laws’ enshrine state-approved interpretations of crucial historical events and promote
certain narratives about the past, by banning, for example, the propagation of totalitarian ideologies
or criminalising expressions which deny, grossly minimize, approve, or justify acts constituting
genocide or crimes against humanity, as defined by international law.” Council of Europe, ‘Memory
Laws’ and Freedom of Expression 1 (July 2018), available at https://rm.coe.int/factsheet-onmemory-laws-july2018-docx/16808c1690. However, the use of law to actively construct cultural
memory, as Europe justly worries about, is a different enterprise than the one advocated in this
Article: the recognition that statutes and regulations created to address public problems constitute
contextually situated records of cultural memory.
13
In contrast, historians often find the laws of earlier times valuable resources in reconstructing
historical cultural norms or in establishing the bases of later reform and evolution. E.g., Michael M.
Sheehan, Marriage Theory and Practice in the Conciliar Legislation and Diocensan Statutes of
Medieval England, 40 MEDIEVAL STUDIES 408, 408-460 (1978).
14
[Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory History (DRAFT 2021)]
15
E.g., County of Maui, Haw., v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, --- U.S.---, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468-69, 147172, 1476 (2020) (emphasizing Congress’s purposes in interpreting the Clean Water Act and
including an examination of legislative history); Gundy v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2126 (2019) (noting that “beyond context and structure, the Court often looks to ‘history [and]
purpose’ to divine the meaning of language” (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted))); Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561,
576 (2007) (relying on legislative history); McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861-63 (2005) (discussing the importance of legislative purpose to
statutory interpretation).
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In the 21st century, acknowledging the cultural memory embedded in public
law serves two different governance goals, particularly when those regulatory
regimes have existed for a decade or longer. First, as a memory institution, the laws
and regulations at issue are reminders of how their drafters understood the world
and the problem at hand, allowing would-be reformers to assess whether those
understandings remain objectively valid. As one contemporary example, I and
others have argued extensively that the Anthropocene and the increasing impacts
of climate change demand a re-evaluation and replacement of regulatory regimes
that assume the stationarity of ecological and social-ecological systems,16 including
new approaches to climate change adaptation.17 The regimes in need of significant
amendment to acknowledge these evolved scientific understandings include most
of the natural resources, public lands, and environmental statutes adopted
throughout the 20th century.18 The crucial cultural memory embedded in these
public laws is the Balance of Nature model of ecosystems prevalent in scientific
discourse at the time Congress and state legislatures adopted them.19 Recovering
that cultural memory illuminates the facts both that our understanding of how
complex systems behave has changed significantly since the 1970s, undermining
16
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See generally, e.g., Karrigan Börk, Guest Species: Rethinking Our Approach to Biodiversity in
the Anthropocene, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 169; MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE
END OF SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE (Kansas Univ. Press, 2017); Kalyani Robbins, The Biodiversity Paradigm Shift:
Adapting the Endangered Species Act to Climate Change, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (2015);
Lance H. Gunderson, Ahjond Garmestani, Keith W. Rizzardi, J.B. Ruhl, & Alfred Light, Escaping
a Rigidity Trap: Governance and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in the Everglades Social
Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 127 (2014) ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, COMPARATIVE OCEAN
GOVERNANCE: PLACE-BASED PROTECTIONS IN AN ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Edward Elgar, 2012);
Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws to a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change
Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269 (2012); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9
(2010); Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law
under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. REGULATION 171 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation
and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010); Robert L.
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive
Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833 (2009); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change
and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1
(2008).
17
J.B. Ruhl & Robin Kundis Craig, 4°C (forthcoming 2022).
18
Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How Program Goals
and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 743806 (2016) (assessing the federal public lands statutes); CRAIG, supra note 16, at 47-65, 91-169
(assessing current legal approaches to marine protected areas); Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at
31-40 (assessing pollution control and natural resources statutes); Camacho, Assisted Migration,
supra note 16, at 188-210 (assessing species-related and public lands statutes); Ruhl, Structural
Transformation, supra note 16, at 391-433 (assessing a broad swath of environmental and natural
resources statutes).
19
Melinda H. Benson, New Materialism: An Ontology for the Anthropocene, 59 NATURAL RES. J.
251, 261 (2019); BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 16, at 31, 57, 165-66; Craig, Stationarity, supra note
16, at 32.
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these statutes’ regulatory premises,20 and that climate change is accelerating
systemic change, undermining these statutes’ continuing abilities to function
productively.21 In other words, acknowledging this first cultural memory function
of law helps law- and policymakers to better evaluate when legal regimes do, in
fact, need to change.
This Article, however, explores the second governance function served by
acknowledging that public law is a form of cultural memory: improved evaluation
of whether apparently outdated legal regimes really should remain in place.
Specifically, it posits that when legal regimes exist to curb human impulses and
behaviors that have been demonstrated to cumulatively damage society as a whole,
those regimes serve as important reminders that removal of existing restraints is
likely to re-create old problems. Thus, even in the environmental context, an
evolved understanding of system dynamics and climate change impacts does not
change the fact that pollution control regimes—that is, restraints on historically
demonstrated human tendencies to contaminate commons resources (air, rivers,
lakes, land, the ocean) with toxics and other damaging pollutants—remain critical
protectors of human health and environmental quality in the 21st century.22 Failure
to heed these reminders, in contrast, allows the regulatory regime to fall victim to
the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome.
Shelby County provides a significant example. Contrary to some
characterizations,23 the Supreme Court majority did not forget its history. It
acknowledged, for example, why Congress had singled out certain states for special
treatment under the Voting Rights Act: “In the 1890s, Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, began to
enact literacy tests for voter registration and to employ other methods designed to
prevent African-Americans from voting,” and as courts struck down these
measures, “States came up with new ways to discriminate,” effectively preventing
registration of black voters.24 Instead, the majority concluded that the Act’s
distinctions among states based on historic practices had served their purposes—
specifically, that the states whose voting laws were still subject to federal approval
had come into line with, or even improved upon, the rest of the country in terms of
black voter registration.25 In the majority’s view, “things have changed
dramatically.”26 The Act had done—emphasis on the past tense—its job,27 and the
20
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BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 16, at 56-70; Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 39-40; Camacho,
Assisted Migration, supra note 16, at 179-88.
21
Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 46-48; Camacho, Assisted Migration, supra note 16, at 188210; Ruhl, Structural Transformation, supra note 16, at 391-433; Glicksman, supra note 16, at 83951.
22
Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 45-46.
23
E.g., Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 357, 357-59,
385 (2013).
24
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966)).
25
Id. at 547-49.
26
Id. at 547.
27
Specifically, according to the Court:
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objective regulatory baseline had, according to the majority, moved in
constitutionally significant ways.28 Problem solved.
In contrast, the dissenters (and, in their view, Congress) appreciated the fact
that the Voter Rights Act’s preclearance requirements were still doing their job,
“facilitat[ing] completion of the impressive gains thus far made” and, hinting at the
human impulse problem, “guard[ing] against backsliding.”29 The aftermath of the
decision supports their conclusion that the most important regulatory baseline at
issue, a state impulse to discriminate. had not, in fact, moved significantly—that is,
in the terms of this Article, that the majority Justices reached their constitutional

er
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Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula
captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the
1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years. And
voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States have risen dramatically in the
years since. Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence justifying the
preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. There is no longer such a disparity.

pe

In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent history of voting
tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics.
Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer
divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.
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Id. at 551. See also K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political
Economy in the New Gilded Age: Toward a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329,
1335 (2016) (“The Court's dismantling of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County can be understood
as an argument that underlying structural political inequalities that may have justified preclearance
are no longer present, and thus ordinary political competition, like market competition, is sufficient
to ensure freedom of choice and basic political equality.”).
28
Other scholars have also explicitly characterized the Shelby County majority’s opinion as
reflecting the Justice’s perception of an objectively shifted baseline. See Diane S. Sykes,
Minimalism and Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 17, 32 (noting that “the Court had
transparently signaled its discomfort with the coverage formula, which was based on a decades-old
baseline that did not reflect changes in voting and discriminatory election practices when Congress
reauthorized the Act in 2006.”).
29
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 559-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As Joel Heller has more extensively
described the survival of this impulse in areas still suffering from the burdensome memory of past
discrimination:

Pr

ep

An awareness of the long history of voting discrimination on account of race in a
jurisdiction may affect the attitudes of present-day policymakers towards race and the right
to vote, and thus may influence the types of voting policies that they enact. One possibility
is that local or state officials charged with setting voting policies and election procedures
will ignore any burden that a policy has on minority voters as simply a natural or
unavoidable phenomenon. Centuries of precedent exist for inequality in this area of civic
life, and these policymakers know that their not-too-distant predecessors in office enacted
and administered such policies with a large degree of indifference, or even support, in their
communities.

Heller, supra note 23, at 385-86.

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793991

ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG

Spring

iew
ed

10

pe

er
r

ev

conclusion based on the distorting effects of the regulatory shifting baseline
syndrome. The Brennan Center for Justice notes that “[w]ithin 24 hours of the
ruling, Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo ID law. Two other
states, Mississippi and Alabama, also began to enforce photo ID laws that had
previously been barred because of federal preclearance.”30 In a 2018 report, the
Center further concluded that “the Supreme Court’s 2013 Shelby County v. Holder
ruling, which neutered the strongest legal protection against voting discrimination,
changed the landscape. A flood of new barriers to voting that would have otherwise
been blocked were implemented at once, and newly unfettered legislatures were
incentivized to press forward with additional restrictions.”31
Importantly, the need to invoke the cultural memory function of public laws
varies by regulatory context. Long-existing regulatory regimes that seem equally
incorporated into societal norms nevertheless differentially fall victim to
generational amnesia regarding their continuing efficacy. For example, despite
their 80-year existence, the protections afforded children through child labor laws
remain socially and politically salient. Until the early part of the 20th century, most
children in working class families worked long hours, often under dangerous
conditions, and from very young ages.32 Congress began to intervene as early as
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The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/effects-shelby-county-v-holder.
31
Wendy Weise & Max Feldman, Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, The State of
Voting
2018,
at
5
(2018)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_State_of_Voting_2018.pdf. The
fact that, by 2018, a total of 23 states had enacted more restrictive voting laws that disparately
impacted people of color and other vulnerable populations arguably suggests that federal
preclearance requirements should apply to more states rather than none. See id. at 5-7; see also
Franita Tolson, The Law of Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of Voting Rights
and Judicial Regulation of the Political Thicket, 43 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 345, 350 (2016) (noting
that “most states have used their power over voter qualifications, which is significantly broader in
the wake of Shelby County, to sharply define and limit who can participate in elections. In the last
few years alone, states have enacted dozens of laws that make it considerably harder to vote … .”).
Notably, the Shelby County decision also shifted the burden of proving the discriminatory impacts
of voting laws from the covered governments (who had to show nondiscrimination) to
disenfranchised voters, and it effectively shielded municipal ordinances related to voting from much
scrutiny at all. Sam Levine & Ankita Rao, In 2013 the supreme court gutted voting rights—how has
it changed the US?, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2020, 13:14 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/jun/25/shelby-county-anniversary-voting-rights-act-consequences.
32
Congressional Research Service, Child Labor in America: History, Policy, and Legislative Issues
1
(as
updated
2013),
available
at
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20131118_RL31501_008741c7351fd72ae2a262198ba9c0e4
4921a60a.pdf. See also Joanna Grisinger, Book Review, James D. Schmidt, Industrial Violence and
the Legal Origins of Child Labor, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 649, 649-50 (2011) (“describing nineteenthcentury producerist ideology, which valued individuals as workers. For Appalachian working
families, clear lines between childhood and adulthood were absent. Instead, children were brought
into the workplace to perform tasks appropriate to their size and skill level, growing into their roles
as workers as they became adults.”).

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793991

REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME

11

iew
ed

2021

er
r

ev

1906,33 culminating in the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.34 As is
true for many new regulatory regimes affecting business, employers initially
resisted the restrictions on child labor, necessitating additional restrictions and
improved enforcement.35 However, “since roughly the late 1980s, child labor in its
various aspects has largely disappeared from the policy scene; the issue is often
viewed as a remnant of an earlier period in American history.”36
Nevertheless, despite the apparent normification of child labor prohibitions and
restrictions, no group strongly advocates that these restrictions have become
unnecessary. In the terms of this Article, successive generations of U.S. society
have not forgotten that child labor restrictions continue to provide important
protections to children. That memory remains accessible in part because evidence
indicates that many employers still violate restrictions on child labor, especially
with respect to adolescents and immigrant children.37 Moreover, advocates for
children often view these public law protections of children as incomplete,38 with
organizations like the American Federation of Teachers seeking to extend existing
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However, its early efforts were often unsuccessful. See, e.g., Constitutional Law—Federal Child
Labor Law Invalid, 27 YALE L.J. 1092, 1092-93 (1918) (summarizing the then-recent Supreme
Court decision).
34
Congressional Research Service, supra note 32 at 2-5. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified
as 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the child labor prohibitions are found in Section 212.
35
Congressional Research Service, supra note 32, at 5 (citation omitted).
36
Id. at 1.
37
Priyanka Boghani, Q&A:America’s “Invisible” Child Labor Problem, PBS FRONTLINE (April 24,
2018),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/qa-americas-invisible-child-labor-problem/;
Alana Semuels, How Common Is Child Labor in the U.S.?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/how-common-is-chid-labor-in-theus/383687/; Kimberly J. Rauscher, Carol W. Runyan, Michael D. Schulman, & J. Michael Bowling,
US Child Labor Violations in the Retail and Service Industries: Findings From a National Survey
of Working Adolescents, 98:9 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1693, 1693-98 (2008), doi:
10.2105/AJPH.2007.122853; Ana Maria Echiburu, Immigration Raid Results in Charges Filed
Against Iowa Slaughterhouse for Child Labor Violations, 14 PUBLIC INTEREST L. REP. 93, 94 (2008)
(“Child labor laws in Iowa prohibit children below the age of eighteen from working in a
meatpacking plant. Employees in meat packing plants are exposed to dangerous machines and
chemicals and often have to make thousands of cuts every day with sharp knives, risking lacerations,
nerve damage, or muscle damage. The brutal environment of a meatpacking plant is not an
appropriate place for children. Yet, the May 12 immigration raid of Agriprocessors in Iowa,
uncovered underage employees working in such conditions, which is something Americans are
unaccustomed to hearing about in the United States.”); Susan Makdisi, Student Essay, Child Labor,
4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 281, 281 (1998) (“Imagine a place where children go to work on farms, in
factories, on the streets, or in an industry, working five to sixteen hours a day, five to seven days a
week. … This happens all over the world, including America and other developed countries.”).
38
E.g., Meret Thali, Note, Missing Childhood: How Cultural Norms and Government Systems
Continue to Support Child Labor in Agriculture, 20 DRAKE J. AGRICULTURAL L. 453, 454-55 (2015)
(“This widespread general acceptance and promotion of children working in agriculture in the
United States has led to federal legislation that has failed to protect these children, even though they
are working in what is considered one of the three most dangerous sectors of labor.”).
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restrictions to agriculture, which the Fair Labor Standards Act largely exempts.39
Problem not, in other words, completely solved.
As with the Voting Rights Act, however, the success of a public law regime can
be so (apparently) complete that people come to believe that its restrictions are no
longer necessary. Under the influence of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome,
the (apparent) disappearance of the problem transforms an initial cultural respect
for the regulatory regime (it worked!) into a psychological resetting of the
regulatory baseline—essentially, “we no longer have to worry about that problem
and these laws are now an impediment to other things we want to do.” In particular,
the disappearance of a specific problem can allow interest groups to re-frame the
corrective regulatory regime as unnecessary, burdensome, expensive, or an
infringement of private or states’ rights. In short, the perceived regulatory baseline
shifts, inducing policymakers and legislators to view the existing legal regime as
no longer necessary and perhaps even harmful, opening those legal protections to
political re-evaluation, undermining, and perhaps even elimination. At the extreme,
the political and policymaking systems wipe their cultural memory, countervailing
pressures induce politicians and legislatures to dismantle or weaken the nowdevalued regimes—and history repeats itself.
Applying a regulatory shifting baseline syndrome analysis to evolving and often
contentious public debates therefore has the potential to reveal an important cultural
component to the evolution of public law and policy: people, including politicians
and legislators, forget the past, and this generational amnesia can change the
contours of the relevant political and legal debate. This generational amnesia allows
both government officials and the affected members of the public to question past
regulatory decisions and past risk assessments in ways that would have been
laughable two or three generations ago.
This Article argues that identifying and resisting the regulatory shifting baseline
syndrome offers one means of keeping needed public protections in place, avoiding
the re-emergence of public commons problems that momentarily appear to have
been “solved.” Specifically, awareness of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome
should prompt a reframing of the status of the public problem under consideration
from the objective manifestation (in Shelby County, racial disparities in voter
registration) to the human impulses underlying that manifestation (in Shelby
County, the impulse to discriminate). In so doing, the relevant questions for
evaluating the regime’s continued existential value become not just Did it work?
(racial disparities eliminated, at least momentarily) but also—and for purposes of
avoiding the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, more importantly—What is
likely to happen when the regime’s protections are removed?
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the shifting baseline
syndrome in its original context, then transitions the psychology of fisheries
regulation into the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. Part II examines the 2008
39

Child Labor in the United States, AMER. FED. TEACHERS (as viewed January 23, 2021),
https://www.aft.org/community/child-labor-united-states.
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financial crisis as an example of this syndrome operating across multiple financial
developments that nevertheless illustrate regulators’ repeated susceptibility to
discounting the vulnerability of our economic system to systemic risk resulting
from individual profit-seeking. In Parts III and IV, this Article re-frames two
current public debates—the resistance to childhood vaccination and the convoluted
debate over the breadth of “waters of the United States” under the federal Clean
Water Act—as evidence of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome in operation.
Specifically, this Article argues that both controversies are inextricably bound up
in cultural “forgettings” that are, paradoxically, the perverse result of the previous
and highly successful laws and policies governing these two issues. Recapturing
the cultural memories that those two regulatory regimes embody should thus be an
important first step in both: (1) understanding the revaluations of those regimes
currently in process; and (2) reminding the affected communities of why those
regimes came to exist in the first place and their continuing roles in preventing the
evils whose absence the general public and legislators now take for granted.
Like the fisheries scientists who discovered the shifting baseline syndrome, this
Article concludes that the re-animation of historical knowledge and cultural
memory is an important corrective to the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome.
However, the emphasis here is different. In the ecological shifting baseline
syndrome, historical reconstruction informs the creation of new regulatory goals.
In the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, in contrast, accurate historical
reconstruction and revival of cultural memory, with full appreciation of regulatory
regimes as memory institutions, serves to prevent policymakers, legislatures, and
courts from whittling away at seemingly outdated rules by reminding them that the
rules are the reason that the societal evil has gone away—i.e., the regulatory regime
worked, and, more importantly, is still working, to curb individual human behaviors
that damage the greater public good.
I. THE SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME IN FISHERIES AND OTHER ECOLOGICAL
MANAGEMENT
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Humans forget things, both individually and in societal groups. Such forgettings
can have significant consequences regarding when, how, and to what extent
societies regulate to protect the general public good. In natural resource
management, for example, one of the most well-studied and consequential
phenomena resulting from this cultural amnesia has been the shifting baseline
syndrome. First identified in marine fisheries management, the shifting baseline
syndrome results from a society’s collective inability to accurately remember
historical ecological conditions and compare them to existing conditions, skewing
the focus and goals of natural resource management from what might be considered
optimal.
This Part explores the origins of the shifting baseline syndrome in natural
resource management in order to highlight the solutions identified to counteract the
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syndrome. Specifically, biologists and ecologists of all specialties have
increasingly embraced the need to reconstruct historical states in order to recapture
forgotten understandings of what is “normal.” These recaptured cultural memories
can then inform contemporary regulation by, at the very least, identifying a wider
range of potential management goals.
A.

Daniel Pauly’s Insight: The Origin of the Shifting Baseline Syndrome
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In 1995, marine biologist Daniel Pauly coined the term “shifting baseline
syndrome” to identify a key problem in fisheries management and modeling:
fisheries scientists were becoming separated “from the biologists studying marine
or freshwater organisms and/or communities,” leading those scientists “to factor
out ecological and evolutionary considerations from our models.”40 The resulting
myopic focus on fishers, fishing fleets, and catch numbers induced the syndrome,
which
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has arisen because each generation of fisheries scientists accepts as a
baseline the stock size and species composition that occurred at the
beginning of their careers, and uses this to evaluate changes. When
the next generation starts its career, the stocks have further declined,
but it is the stocks at that time that serve as a new baseline. The result
obviously is a gradual shift of the baseline, a gradual accommodation
of the creeping disappearance of resource species, and inappropriate
reference points for evaluating economic losses resulting from
overfishing, or for identifying targets for rehabilitation measures.41
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What fisheries scientists needed, Pauly continued, was a method for
incorporating historical observations of fisheries abundance and species
diversity—generally dismissed as “anecdotes”—into contemporary fishery
management policy, much as contemporary astronomers incorporate ancient
observations “of sunspots, comets, supernovae, and other phenomena” and
oceanographers continue to make use of the physical data collected by mariners
from at least the 19th century.42 Citing two such historical looks at fishing impacts
with approval, Pauly concluded that “[f]rameworks that maximize the use of
fisheries history would help us to understand and to overcome—in part at least—
the shifting baseline syndrome, and hence to evaluate the true social and ecological
costs of fisheries.”43

40

Pauly, supra note 5, at 430.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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Pauly and other marine scientists have now documented the shifting baseline
syndrome in fisheries around the world.44 Moreover, these scientists have
institutionalized the collection of historical fisheries data as one means of
counteracting the syndrome,45 essentially arguing that the more they can document
the actual historical state of fisheries and marine ecosystems, the greater the chance
that fisheries policies and catch limits will reflect both the true historical abundance
of targeted fish species and the complexity of the marine ecosystems of which these
species were a part.
Legal scholars, in turn, have argued that emerging historical insights into
ecosystem change from these biological and ecological reconstructions should
broadly inform current marine management policy and law. 46 Moreover, historical
44
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E.g., Fiona T. Francis, Brett R. Howard, Adrienne E. Berchtold, Trevor A. Branch, Laís C.T.
Chaves, Jillian C. Dunic, Brett Favaro, Kyla M. Jeffrey, Luis Malpica-Cruz, Natalie Maslowski,
Jessica A. Schultz, Nicola S. Smith, & Isabelle M. Côté, Shifting headlines? Size trends of
newsworthy fishes, 7 PEERJ e6395 (2019), doi: 10.7717/peerj.6395; H.A. Maia, R.A. Morais, A.C.
Siqueira, N. Hanazaki, S.R. Floeter, & M.G. Bender, Shifting baselines among traditional fishers
in São Tomé and Príncipe islands, Gulf of Guinea, 154 OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT 133,
133-142 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.01.006; Sean Berger, Historical
Ecology and Shifting Baseline Syndrome in the Kawartha Lakes, Ontario (M.A. Thesis, Trent
University,
2018),
available
at
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2042371835?pqorigsite=primo; Maite Erauskin-Extramiana, Sharon Z. Herzka, Gustavo Hinojosa-Arango, &
Octavio Aburto-Oropeza, An interdisciplinary approach to evaluate the status of large-bodied
Serranid fisheries: The case of Magdalena-Almejas Bay lagoon complex, Baja California Sur,
Mexico,
145
OCEAN
&
COASTAL
MANAGEMENT
21,
21-34
(2017),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2017.05.005; Annabel A. Plumeridge & Callum M. Roberts,
Conservation targets in marine protected area management suffer from shifting baseline syndrome:
A case study on the Dogger Bank, 116 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 395, 395-404 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2017.01.012; Tomaso Fortibuoni, Diego Borme, Gianluca
Franceschini, Otello Giovanardi, & Sasa Raicevich, Common, rare or extirpated? Shifting baselines
for common angelshark, Squatina squatina (Elasmobranchii: Squatinidae), in the Northern Adriatic
Sea (Mediterranean Sea), 772 HYDROBIOLOGIA 247, 247-51 (2016), DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10750-016-2671-4; A. J. Venkatachalam, A. R. G. Price, S.
Chandrasekara, S. Senaratna Sellamuttu, & J. Kaler, Changes in Frigate Tuna Populations on the
South Coast of Sri Lanka: Evidence of the Shifting Baseline Syndrome from Analysis of Fisher
Observations, 20 MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 167, 167-76 (2010), https://doiorg.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/10.1002/aqc.1068; Samuel T Turvey, Leigh A. Barrett, Hao Yujiang,
Zhang Lei, Zhang Xivqiao, Wang Xianyan, Huang Yadong, zhou Kaiya, Tom Hart, & Wang Ding,
Rapidly Shifting Baselines in Yangtze Fishing Communities and Local Memory of Extinct Species,
24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 778-87 (2010); Cameron H. Ainsworth, Tony J. Pitcher, & Christovel
Rotinsulu, Evidence of Fishery Depletion and Shifting Cognitive Baselines in Eastern Indonesia,
141 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 848-859 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2008.01.006.
45
E.g., Dirk Zeller, Rainer Froese, & Daniel Pauly, On Losing and Recovering Fisheries and Marine
Science Data, 29 MARINE POL’Y 69, 69-73 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2004.02.003;
Jeremy B.C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems,
293 SCIENCE 629-637 (2001).
46
E.g., Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife through World Trade Law, 30 MICHIGAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 599, 602-03 (2009); Robin Kundis Craig, Taking Steps Toward
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reflection on the law’s influence on a particular fishing industry over time can
suggest improvements to the regulation of that industry.47 Even Pauly himself
published in a law review to argue that the historical evidence of dramatic
reductions in marine fish stocks necessitates the legal creation of marine reserves
as well as the elimination of subsidies to fishers.48
C.

The Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Ecology, Conservation, and
Ecological Management
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As a concept, the shifting baseline syndrome has also moved beyond fisheries.
In particular, researchers have acknowledged the importance of this syndrome to
other areas of ecological regulation, such as endangered species protection,49
ecological restoration,50 and ecosystem management more generally.51 Under this
more generalized conception of “environmental generational amnesia,”52 “each
generation grows up being accustomed to the way their environment looks and
feels, and so, in a system experiencing progressive impoverishment, they do not
recognize how degraded it has become over the course of previous generations.”53
Multiple studies outside of fisheries have empirically demonstrated
intergenerational differences in resource perception, from bird species in Yorkshire
to deforestation in the Beni, Bolivia, to water availability and quality in Alaska.54
These studies indicate that the shifting baseline syndrome operates in regulatory
regimes to keep ecosystems in impoverished states,55 but they also suggest that
when historical reconstructions can take hold and correct those shifted perceptions,
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Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,
34 MCGEORGE LAW REVIEW 155, 157 (2003); Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean
Ecosystems: Historical Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY LAW
QUARTERLY 649 (2002).
47
Danielle Ringer, Courtney Carothers, Rachel Donkersloot, Jesse Coleman, & Paula Cullenberg,
For generations to come? The privatization paradigm and shifting social baselines in Kodiak,
Alaska's
commercial
fisheries,
98
MARINE
POL’Y
97,
97-103
(2018),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.09.009.
48
Daniel Pauly, Unsustainable Marine Fisheries, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT L. & POL’Y 10,
10-11 (2006).
49
E.g., Frank Sturges, Humane Society of the United States v. Zinke (D.C. Cir 2017): Shifting
Baselines in the Endangered Species Act, 43 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2019).
50
Matias Guerrero-Gatica, Enrique Aliste, & Javier Simonetti, Shifting Gears for the Use of the
Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Ecological Restoration, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 1458 (2019).
51
Masashi Soga & Kevin J. Gaston, Shifting Baseline Syndrome: Causes, Consequences, and
Implications, 16 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 222-30 (2018).
52
P.H. Kahn Jr., Children’s affiliations with nature: structure, development, and the problem of
environmental generational amnesia, in CHILDREN AND NATURE: PSYCHOLOGICAL,
SOCIOCULTURAL, AND EVOLUTIONARY INVESTIGATIONS (P.H KAHN JR. & S.R. KELLERT EDS.) 93,
93-94 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
53
Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 222.
54
Id. at 223.
55
Guerrero-Gatica, Aliste, & Simonetti, supra note 50, at 1460; Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at
222.
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more productive management decisions and even, in some cases, restoration
become possible. Arguably, therefore. “the fundamental driver of [the shifting
baseline syndrome is the lack, or paucity, of relevant historical data on the natural
environment.”56 “Without reliable historical environmental data, people cannot
infer whether long-term environmental changes have occurred, nor to what extent,
and so they have little choice but to deﬁne baselines according to their own
knowledge and experiences . . . .”57
Ecological studies of the shifting baseline syndrome outside of fisheries have
been increasing, with direct expectations for policymakers and managers.58 For
example, defining the shifting baseline syndrome “as a downward shift in
perceptions or expectations of an environmental baseline as a consequence of
biological change,” Guerrero-Gatica et al. argue that accurate descriptions of how
the shifting baseline syndrome is actually operating in a given specific system may
not only improve conservation and restoration efforts but also identify mismatches
in science-based management goals and community expectations.59 In turn, Soga
and Gaston traced three specific consequences of the shifting baseline syndrome,
all of which are directly relevant to environmental policymaking. “The first, and
most immediate, is an increased societal tolerance for progressive environmental
degradation, including declining wildlife populations, loss of natural habitats, and
increasing pollution.”60 “Second, [the shifting baseline syndrome] is also likely to
alter people’s expectations as to what is a desirable (i.e. worth protecting) state of
the natural environment.”61 “Third, if policy makers and resource managers have
false perceptions of past environmental conditions, they may set inappropriate
targets for environmental conservation, restoration, and management programs.”62
Thus, they advocate increasing monitoring and data collection, including
reconstructing historical conditions from the available data.63
Notably, recovering historical ecological data can correct current management
misperceptions in multiple directions. While, for the most part, such historical
reconstructions confirm that contemporary perceptions of “normal” are in fact
highly impoverished, occasionally other lessons emerge. For example, an historical
reconstruction of Caribbean monk seal populations indicates that the species’
population was always small and fragmented and that its extinction resulted from a
number of factors, challenging the common wisdom that human hunters decimated
a large and thriving population.64 Thus, sometimes contemporary assumptions
56

Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 224.
Id.
58
Guerrero-Gatica, Aliste, & Simonetti, supra note 50, at 1462 & 1463 fig. 2.
59
Id. at 1467-68.
60
Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 225.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
63
Id. at 226-28.
64
Julio A. Baisre, Shifting Baselines and the Extinction of the Caribbean Monk Seal, 27 CONSERV.
BIOL 927, 933 (2013), DOI: 10.1111/cobi.l2107.
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Because the shifting baseline syndrome has always emerged from subjective
human perception and psychology rather than objective ecological reality, there is
no reason that human “forgetting” (societal or generational amnesia) would not be
an important factor in other areas of human management besides fisheries and
ecological conservation. Indeed, commenters have concluded that the syndrome
has been at work in everything from personal weight gain66 to government and
business leadership67 to religious doctrine68 to the acceptance of non-tenure track
positions in higher education.69
To deal with these multiplying applications of “shifting baseline syndrome,”
conservation biologists helpfully have identified two forms of the syndrome:
generational amnesia and personal amnesia.70 Like Pauly’s original
characterization of the shifting baseline syndrome in fisheries, this Article is more
interested in generational amnesia, which “describes individuals setting their
perceptions from their own experience, and failing to pass their experience on to
future generations. Thus, as observers leave a system, the population’s perception
of normality up-dates and past conditions are forgotten.”71 This form of the shifting
baseline syndrome “is a cautionary tale referring to changing human perceptions of
biological systems due to loss of experience about past conditions.”72 Viewing the
65
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See also, e.g., Simon Albert, Mark Love, & Tom D. Brewer, Contrasts in Social and Ecological
Assessments of Coral Reef Health in Melanesia, 67 PAC. SCI. 409, 409-24 (2013) (concluding that
residents of the Solomon Islands perceive their coral reefs to be more degraded from historical
conditions that they actually are, while people in Fiji failed to perceive that their coral reefs had
degraded).
66
Randy Olson, Slow Motion Disaster Below the Waves, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2002 12:00 AM PT),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-nov-17-op-olson17-story.html (“If your ideal
weight used to be 150 pounds and now it’s 160, your baseline—as well as your waistline—has
shifted.”).
67
Art Petty, Leadership and Shifting Baseline Syndrome, GOV’T EXEC. (April 28, 2017),
https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/04/leadership-and-shifting-baselinesyndrome/137276/.
68
Matt, Shifting Baseline Syndrome and the Church, CHURCHTHOUGHT (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://churchthought.com/shifting-baseline-syndrome-church/.
69
Josh Boldt, Off Track: Higher Education’s Shifting Baseline Syndrome, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (Dec. 10, 2013), https://community.chronicle.com/news/211-off-track-highereducation-s-shifting-baseline-syndrome.
70
S.K. Papworth, J. Rist, L. Coad, & E.J. Milner-Gulland, Evidence for shifting baseline syndrome
in conservation, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 93, 93 (2009), doi: 10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00049.x.
71
Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, “Personal amnesia describes individuals updating their own
perception of normality; so that even those who experienced different previous conditions believe
that current conditions are the same as past conditions.” Id.
72
Id.
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syndrome more broadly, it is from this generational perspective on societal amnesia
that the role of public law as a memory institution becomes most important,
allowing regulatory regimes to remind future generations why they exist.
One should always be cautious in hoping that more information will change
people’s minds about public policy.73 Even in ecological studies, scientists
recognize that “the availability of (even very good) empirical evidence has not
always been sufficient to convince people of historical trends in environmental
conditions. Recent examples of belief- rather than evidence-based environmental
policy making raise the possibility that [the shifting baseline syndrome] could even
accelerate in an age of increasing data availability.”74
Nevertheless, efforts to identify and correct the regulatory shifting baseline
syndrome may have an advantage over efforts to correct ecological shifting baseline
syndromes. While ecological change might have many causes,75 and historical
accounts of prior bounty dismissed as exaggerated tall tales,76 there is no escaping
the fact that humans, and humans alone, create regulatory regimes. Therefore, the
fact that past legislatures, regulatory agencies, and other policymakers bothered to
engage in this labor is inescapable evidence that they thought something was
wrong. In this very real sense, public law is historical knowledge, and its
persistence over time renders it a cultural memory institution.
There are, of course, excellent reasons to change established regulatory
regimes. As the Introduction noted, legal regimes grounded in an outdated scientific
model of how ecological and biogeological systems actually function should be
updated to reflect new science. Evolving conceptions of ethics and morality may
also undermine past legal regimes; in the United States, the abolishment of slavery77
and the progressive elimination of the death penalty78 are two prominent examples
of this motivation for legal change.
Nevertheless, many public law regulatory regimes reflect the fact that we have
73
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E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds; Timothy D.
Hanks & Christopher Summerfield, Perceptual decision making in rodents, monkeys, and
humans, 93 NEURON 15, 22 (2017).
74
Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 224.
75
Katharina E. Fabricius & Glenn De'ath, Identifying Ecological Change and Its Causes: A Case
Study on Coral Reefs, 14 Ecol. Applications 1448, 1448 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1890/03-5320.
76
Loren McClenachan, Andrew B. Cooper, Matthew G. McKenzie, & Joshua A. Drew, The
Importance of Surprising Results and Best Practices in Historical Ecology, 65 BIOSCIENCE 932,
932-33, 938 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biv100.
77
U.S. CONST., amend 13, § 1 (ratified 1865).
78
E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars
Louisiana from imposing the death penalty as a sanction for the rape of a child when the crime did
not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the child); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002) (holding unconstitutional Virginia’s application of the death penalty to the mentally
disabled); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that imposition of the death
penalty is unconstitutional when the defendant committed the murder at age 15); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-305 (1976) (holding that North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty for
first-degree murder is unconstitutional).
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learned something important about ourselves as human beings—particularly about
the cumulative societal impacts of multitudinous (e.g., polluters) or domineering
(e.g., 19th-century monopolists) individual behavioral impulses playing out on a
national stage, destabilizing or otherwise deleteriously affecting various aspects of
the public commons.79 As the next three parts suggest, these experiential lessons,
memorialized in regulatory regimes, are unlikely to lose their value unless and until
human nature itself fundamentally transforms. They explore the workings of the
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome in three very different contexts—financial
regulation, vaccines, and water quality protection—to suggest the different ways in
which the syndrome can illuminate and inform discussions of whether and how to
reform public law regimes.
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II. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE 2008 ECONOMIC CRASH AS THE PRODUCT OF
A REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME

pe

There are many, many ways to tell the story of the 2008 financial crisis.
“Unrelenting greed,” for example, is a popular narrative, particularly in Hollywood
movies.80 “Regulators asleep at the wheel” is another.81 More academically, the
crash can be considered one of several critical junctures in corporations and
79
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While the fit is not always exact, this article refers to many of the public goods (however
aspirational some of them remain) of U.S. society—equal access to voting and other aspects of
political processes, a stable economy, public health, a clean environment—as commons resources
or common-pool resources in the sense that Elinor Ostrom and her co-authors defined it: “natural
and human-constructed resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and
institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability
for others.” Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, & David
Policansky, Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 278
(1999). Public law often operations as an exclusion by limiting how individual entities (persons,
corporations, political parties, even in some circumstances governments) can affect or operate with
the relevant commons and often is quite costly (economically and politically) to enact/promulgate,
build capacity for implementing, and enforce. Nevertheless, in the absence of those regimes,
exploitation for the benefit of those individual entities can put the entire public good at risk for
everyone. “Commons” terminology the aptly undergirds a discussion of the regulatory shifting
baseline syndrome because both describe situations in which governance is an important option
mediating the oft-occurring tensions between the drives and motivations of individual entities and
the best interests of the public as a whole. As Garrett Hardin famously recognized in 1968, the
unrestrained drives of individuals can lead to tragedies for the larger society. Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-45 (1968). However, “tragedies of the commons
are real, but not inevitable”—although the governance challenges multiply as the scale of the
commons increases. Ostrom et al., supra, at 281-82.
80
See, e.g., “The Big Short” (2015); “99 Homes” (2014); “The Queen of Versailles” (2012);
“Margin Call” (2011); “Inside Job” (2010).
81
See, e.g., Chana Joffe-Walt, Regulating AIG: Who Fell Asleep on the Job?, NPR ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED
(June
5,
200911:10
AM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104979546;
Tami
Luhby,
Bank
regulators:”Asleep at the switch,” CNN MONEY (March 4 2008: 5:33 PM EST),
https://money.cnn.com/2008/03/04/news/companies/senatebank/index.htm.
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financial law,82 during which, “overall, there was a systemic breakdown in
accountability and ethics that led to a crisis.”83
This Part contributes to this ongoing discussion by arguing that the 2008
financial crisis was also, at least in part, the product of a recurring regulatory
shifting baseline syndrome in the United States. If, as Jeff Cohodes has recently
argued, financial “regulation exists to both prevent the next financial crisis and
systemic failures, as well as protect against an idiosyncratic bank failure in the
future,” but always operates in tension with banks’ and financial firms’ willingness
to take risks to increase returns,84 then the syndrome, induced by a perceived shifted
baseline of market stability, helped to lead both firms and regulators to increase
private-side risk at the expense of the economic commons’ continued stability. In
essence, the relevant players all forgot that unregulated banking and securities
industries (and, yes, aided by the greed of some of their human constituents) are
more than capable of introducing significant systemic risk into the national and
global economic systems85—a core historic lesson that the United States had
already had to learn at least twice before.
Lesson #1 occurred on October 29, 1929, “Black Tuesday,” when the U.S. stock
market crashed in a flurry of trading—16 million shares on the New York Stock

82

ot

Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Law’s Critical Junctures, Work in Progress
presented at the USC Center for Law and Social Science Workshop, January 11, 2021.
83
Jeff Cohodes, Perspectives on Dodd-Frank Act, Risk Management, and the Financial Crisis of
2008 from a Former Chief Risk Officer, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 533, 536 (2019).
84
Id. at 533-34.
85
In the words of Saule T. Omarova:
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As this crisis demonstrated, the interconnection between retail financial markets and
wholesale financial markets is a complex phenomenon, which raises serious questions
about the continuing wisdom of a deregulatory approach to wholesale financial markets.
Not only did the crisis show that even the wealthiest and the most financially savvy
investors are vulnerable to irrational exuberance and, at times, outright fraud, it has also
highlighted the extent of indirect exposure of the general investing public, the retail
consumers of financial services, to the risks inherent in complex financial transactions in
institutional markets.
Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the “Big Picture”
Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 161 (2009). Moreover:

Pr

ep

More generally, the current financial crisis has brought to light that, as a result of rapid
financial innovation in recent years, risk has become a financial asset in its own right. As
a financial asset, risk is continuously dissected, priced, and traded in a variety of
increasingly esoteric transactions among sophisticated entities. The financial crisis also
drew attention to a hidden paradox: while this virtually limitless “slicing and dicing” of
financial risk may decrease risk exposure for individual market players, it tends to increase
the overall riskiness and vulnerability of the financial system.

Id. at 162.
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Exchange in a single day.86 “Billions of dollars were lost, wiping out thousands of
investors. In the aftermath of Black Tuesday, America and the rest of the
industrialized world spiraled downward into the Great Depression (1929-39), the
deepest and longest-lasting economic downturn in the history of the Western
industrialized world up to that time.”87 The crash enacted a rather violent correction
to the wide and often financially unfounded speculation that had occurred during
the 1920s, “leaving stocks in great excess of their real value” in the face of declining
production, rising unemployment, “low wages, the proliferation of debt, a
struggling agricultural sector and an excess of large bank loans that could not be
liquidated.”88
“The experience of the Great Depression changed attitudes regarding the
regulation of financial markets.”89 First, the 1929 crash spurred the development of
U.S. securities law.90 “After a series of hearings that brought to light the severity of
the abuses leading to the crash of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
(the ‘Securities Act’), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘Exchange
Act’).”91 Designed in particular to curb the lack of information, and often outright
fraud, that had spurred the unwarranted investment frenzies of the 1920s, these laws
required companies to disclose information about themselves and their securities
and created significant liability for fraud.92
Second, the crash and the ensuing Depression led to changes in banking laws.93
Indeed, “Much of the current system is the result of changes put in place during the
1930s.”94 All told, “[t]he reforms in the first half of the twentieth century created a
system of regulatory agencies, most of which remain today, that were organized by
financial activity. Separate agencies focused on separate activities, often with very

86
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Stock Market Crash of 1929, HISTORY.COM (as updated April 6, 2020),
https://www.history.com/topics/great-depression/1929-stock-market-crash.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Matthew Sherman, Center for Economic and Policy Research, A Short History of Financial
Deregulation
in
the
United
States
3
(July
2009),
available
at
https://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf. The Glass-Steagall Act,
also known as the Banking Act of 1933, was the Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 162, and is codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 641, 71a, 197a, 221a, 227, 263, 333-339, 348a, 371a-371d, 374a, 375a,
378, 632.
90
Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, Securities law history,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (as viewed Sept. 7, 2020). See also
Sherman, supra note 89, at 4 (describing these same developments).
91
Id. The Securities Act of 1933, also known as the Fletcher-Rayburn Securities Act of 1933 or the
Truth in Securities Act, was the Act of May 27, 1933, 48 Stat. 74, and is codified as amended as 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat. 881,
and is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78qq.
92
Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, Securities law history,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (as viewed Sept. 7, 2020).
93
Sherman, supra note 89, at 3-4.
94
Id. at 3. See also Bank & Cheffins, supra note 82, at 1-2
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different priorities.”95 These new regulatory regimes remained in place with only
small changes for over four decades.96
After the United States climbed out of the Depression and emerged from World
War II as an international superpower, it enjoyed over half a century of relative
economic stability. To be sure, its economy was punctuated with bear markets and
bull markets and the occasional recession, but it suffered nothing close to the
systemic collapse that occurred on Black Tuesday. Problem apparently solved.
The problem seemed to be so well solved, in fact, that deregulation was deemed
appropriate and desirable beginning in the 1980s.97 As other scholars have
recognized, albeit it in different terms, the perceived baselines regarding the
economy had shifted. For example, Israel Shaked, Paul D’Arezzo, and David
Plastino have focused on changing attitudes about saving and having cash on
hand.98 Importantly, however, they also note that:
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These trends were likely aided by the so-called “great moderation”
beginning in the early 1980s that featured shorter and less severe
economic downturns. Companies on both Wall Street and Main
Street adapted to what were seen as new economic realities by deemphasizing the importance of internally generated cash flows and
cash reserves.99

95
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James R. Hackney, Jr., in turn, takes a more philosophical bent, locating the shifted
baseline in the increasing “belief in market efficiency and informational role of
prices,” which, paradoxically, “held sway through such tumultuous economic times
as the 1980s real estate boom and collapse that led to the savings and loan crisis, as
well as the boom in the high-tech (“dot-com”) industry in the 1990s.”100 At the
same time, comprehension of actual changes in market dynamics—real baselines
that actually had moved—lagged, but it was these changes that allowed the crisis
to become a global one.101
Legal Information Institute, supra note 67, at 4.
Id.
97
Sherman, supra note 89, at 4-6; James R. Hackney, Jr., The Enlightenment and the Financial
Crisis of 2008: An Intellectual History of Corporate Finance Theory, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1257,
1265 (2010). Notably, Alan Greenspan, one of the architects of financial deregulation during his
18-year chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board, in 2008 “admitted that he had put too much
faith in the self-correcting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive
power of wanton mortgage lending.” Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on
Regulation,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Oct.
23,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.
98
Israel Shaked, Paul D’Arezzo, & David Plastino, Financial Crisis of 2008 and Preliminary
Framework for Analyzing Financially Distressed Firms, 27 AMER. BANKRUPTCY INST. J. 42, 42
(2009).
99
Id. (emphasis added).
100
Hackney, supra note 97, at 1265.
101
Omarova, supra note 85, at 157-60.
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In light of inflation rates in the late 1970s that made Depression-era caps on
interest rates unworkable, “President Carter signed into law the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980. The
legislation established a committee to oversee the complete phase-out of interest
rate ceilings within six years.”102 More deregulation followed.103
The most immediate result of this deregulation was Lesson #2: the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s.104 This crisis “was undoubtedly a failure of public policy.
… Institutions entered markets in which they had little experience, and a vulnerable
industry expended beyond the reach of its federal safety net. Supervision and
oversight activities proved to be insufficient, and early intervention was avoided in
the name of regulatory forbearance.”105 Nevertheless, deregulation continued,
aided by Alan Greenspan’s appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in
August 1987.106 This deregulation included, for instance, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999, which repealed the post-Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act that had
prohibited commercial banks from engaging in insurance and securities business.107
According to Hackney, “the belief in free markets had so permeated political
thinking that Glass-Steagall seemed like an unnecessary regulatory artifact of the
New Deal era.”108 In 2000, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act (CFMA), “which limited federal regulation of most over-thecounter derivatives,”109 as a rider attached “to an 11,000-page spending bill.”110
As one might predict, banks began combining functions, and financial firms of
many sorts began experimenting with new forms of derivatives, including the
mortgage-back derivatives that most directly precipitated the 2008 crisis.111 In
2011, the federal Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission singled out the CFMA and
its undermining of securities regulation as a significant cause of new systemic risk
in the U.S. economy that ultimately led to the 2008 financial crisis.112 More
generally, however, the Commission concluded that “this financial crisis was
avoidable”: “The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial
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Sherman, supra note 89, at 6. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 was Public Law No. 96-211, 94 Stat. 132 (Mar. 31, 1980), codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 4a, 93a, 216-216d, 1735f-7a, 1831d and 15 U.S.C. § 1646.
103
Sherman, supra note 89, at 6-8.
104
Id. at 8.
105
Sherman, supra note 89, at 8.
106
Id. at 8-11.
107
Hackney, supra note 97, at 1265-66.
108
Id. at 1266.
109
Duncan Currie, Why Wall Street Collapsed, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 7, 2011),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2011/02/why-wall-street-collapsed-duncan-currie/.
110
Sherman, supra note 89, at 11.
111
Id. at 8-11.
112
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
xxiv
(Jan.
2011),
available
at
https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173545/http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.racks
pacecloud.com/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
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system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving
risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American public.”113 In
particular, and most relevant to this Article, “widespread failures in financial
regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s
financial markets.”114 Overconfidence and a shifted regulatory baseline were key
components of the crisis:
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The sentries were not at their posts, in no small part due to the widely
accepted faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets and the
ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves. More
than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by
financial institutions, championed by former Federal Reserve
chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive
administrations and Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful
financial industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards,
which could have helped avoid catastrophe. This approach had
opened up gaps in oversight of critical areas with trillions of dollars
at risk, such as the shadow banking system and over-the-counter
derivatives markets. In addition, the government permitted financial
firms to pick their preferred regulators in what became a race to the
weakest supervisor.115
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As in 1929, new regulation followed the 2008 crisis, notably the DoddFrank Act.116 Nevertheless, the fact that the pursuit of private profit in un- or
underregulated banking and securities industries will eventually destabilize the
entire economy seems to be a cultural memory that U.S. regulators find
increasingly easy to forget: barely a decade after the 2008 crisis, the federal
government began once again deregulate the financial industry.117
113

Id. at xvii.
Id.
115
Id. at xviii.
116
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (July 21, 2020), codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1b, 6b-1, 6r-6s, 7b-3, 24a, 26; 12 U.S.C. §§ 4b, 16,
25b, 214d, 247b, 1465, 1467b, 1701x-2, 1831c, 1831o-1, 1850a, 1851-1852, 2806, 3353-3355,
4719, 5109, 5112, 5219a, 5219b, 5220b, 5301-5497, 5511-5567, 5581-5587, 5601-5628, 5641; 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-2a, 78c-2 to 78c-5, 78d-4 to 78d-9, 78j-2 to 78j-3, 78m-1, 78 m-2, 78n-1, 78n-2, 78o4a, 78o-7, 78o-9 to 78o-11 78u-6, 78u-7, 78pp, 80b-18b, 80b-18c, 1638a, 1639b-1639h, 1691c-2,
1693o-1, 1693o-2, 7220, 8201-8232, 8301-8325, 8341-8344; 18 U.S.C. § 3301; 22 U.S.C. § 286tt;
and 31 U.S.C. § 313-314.
117
For example, Mark Lebovitch and Jacob Spaid warned in February 2019 that:
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Nearly two years into the Trump presidency, extensive deregulation is raising risks
for investors. Several of the administration’s priorities are endangering financial
markets by reducing corporate accountability and transparency. SEC enforcement
actions under the Administration continue to lag previous years. The Trump
administration has also instructed the SEC to study reducing companies’ reporting
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It is true, of course, that particular market crashes are difficult to predict. It is
also true that financial markets and instruments change, introducing both new
benefits and new problems. What does not change, however, are the facts that
individuals and firms want to make money and that their cumulative creativity in
doing so can eventually introduce systemic risk into the economy as a whole.
Recognizing this fact, Evan Turgeon has argued that the Depression-era regulatory
baseline was the correct one—that is, “to best serve all members of society, the
government should seek to mitigate market risk, while the market should seek to
maximize rewards (which it already does)..”118
Corporate and financial regulatory regimes thus offer fairly clear case studies
of how periods of relative economic stability can induce a regulatory shifting
baseline syndrome. The syndrome distorts perceptions of potential systemic risk,
allowing private profit interests to push a deregulation agenda that undermines the
public law regimes that protect the national (and now international) economic
system. Arguably, U.S. governance is particularly susceptible to this specific
manifestation of the syndrome because wide swaths of American society benefit
from bull markets, undermining public resistance to regulatory “reform” that
promises more of the same. New Deal-era statutes like the repealed Glass-Steagall
Act thus still have an important cultural memory function to play in protecting the
public economic commons, perhaps best summed up in a simple question: Would
we be so eager to dismantle these rules if it were 1930?119
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-VAXXER MOVEMENT AS
A REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME
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The United States declared measles eliminated within its borders in 2000.120
Nevertheless, between mid-December 2014 and mid-February 2015, the Disney
theme parks in Anaheim, California, appeared to be ground zero of a new measles
outbreak. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) documented at
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obligations to investors, including by abandoning a hallmark of corporate
disclosure: the quarterly earnings report. Meanwhile, President Trump and
Congress have passed new legislation loosening regulations on the same banks that
played a central role in the Great Recession.
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Mark Lebovitch & Jacob Spaid, “In Corporations We Trust: Ongoing Deregulation and
Government Protections,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/in-corporations-we-trust-ongoing-deregulation-andgovernment-protections/.
118
Evan N. Turgeon, Boom and Bust for Whom? The Economic Philosophy Behind the 2008
Financial Crisis, 4 VIRG. L. & BUS. REV. 139, 182 (2009).
119
My thanks to Acting Professor Menesh Patel, U.C. Davis School of Law, for this formulation.
120
Morgan Krakow, A tourist infected with measles visited Disneyland and other Southern
California hot spots in mid-August, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2019, 10:36 a.m. MDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/08/24/tourist-infected-with-measles-visiteddisneyland-other-southern-california-hotspots-mid-august/
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least 125 measles cases in the United States that winter, 110 of which involved
California residents.121 Of the California residents, 49 were unvaccinated, including
12 infants too young to be vaccinated; another 47 patients’ vaccination status was
unknown or undocumented; and a handful of others were undervaccinated (i.e.,
lacking the full course of shots).122 Notably, of the 37 vaccine-eligible patients who
definitely were not vaccinated, 28 had purposely chosen to remain unvaccinated
“because of personal beliefs.”123
Measles outbreaks in the United States spiked again in 2019, with the CDC
confirming 1282 cases in 31 states.124 Noting that “[t]his is the greatest number of
cases reported in the U.S. since 1992,” it emphasized again that “[t]he majority of
cases were among people who were not vaccinated against measles.”125
Vaccination is a particularly important protection when it comes to measles because
“[m]easles is one of the most contagious viruses in the world. Around 90 percent
of unvaccinated people exposed to the virus will contract the disease within seven
to 21 days,” with death as one potential outcome.126
Measles has made a comeback in the United States and other countries because
of “mistrust and misinformation campaigns about vaccine safety,”127 a
phenomenon known more colloquially as the Anti-Vaxxer Movement.128 This Part
argues that the contemporary Anti-Vaxxer Movement, and the relaxations of
vaccine mandates that have both accompanied and promoted it, is potentially the
most tragic example of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome at work in the
United States today.
A. Vaccination and the Public Health Commons
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Although not as intuitively obvious as air or water, or even the national
economy, public health is a commons resource,129 where the well-being of society
121
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Jennifer Zipprich, Kathleen Winter, Jill Hacker, Dongxiang Xia, James Watt, & Kathleen
Harriman, Measles Outbreak — California, December 2014–February 2015, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/Mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6406a5.htm.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Measles Cases and Outbreaks (as updated Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html.
125
Id.
126
Krakow, supra note 120.
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., Katie M. Palmer, Why Did Vaccinated People Get Measles at Disneyland? Blame the
Unvaccinated, WIRED (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:08 a.m.), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/vaccinatedpeople-get-measles-disneyland-blame-unvaccinated/ (noting that “most of the people stricken with
Mickey Mouse measles do not understand how vaccines work, because they didn’t get them. The
vast majority of the infected were unvaccinated against the disease, including kids who were too
young for the shots and anti-vaxxers who chose against them. That’s how you get an outbreak.”).
129
Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and
Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE (Richard A. Goodman, Richard E. Hoffman,
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as a whole depends upon—and can be destroyed by—the cumulative effects of
individual choices. For the first time in many decades, all Americans experienced
this reality firsthand in the 2020-2021 pandemic, and that experience should have
revived cultural memories regarding the importance of public health regimes that
reduce the risks of dying from dread diseases. Whether a substantial majority of
Americans will remember remains in some question, but the pandemic and the
public’s recurring rejection of masks and social distancing has brightly illuminated
the public-private interplay of public health.
This dynamic between individual behavior and collective health is also at play
with respect to vaccine-preventable diseases. Sufficiently large numbers of
individual choices to get vaccinated against a particular disease eventually creates
herd immunity.130 Herd immunity, in turn, protects those individuals who either
cannot be vaccinated or who fall within the small percentage of vaccinated
individuals who do not develop a strong enough immune response to keep them
from getting the disease.131 Thus, reducing private and public disease risk from
these diseases are inextricably intertwined.
Moreover, public health professionals already recognize that vaccination
programs can shift both the objective societal disease regulatory baseline and the
subjective individual risk-risk calculation of getting vaccinated.132 Vaccines thus
present an interesting case study of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome
because successful vaccination programs create both legitimate and objectively
verifiable shifts in the regulatory baseline and illegitimate and subjective regulatory
shifting baseline syndromes. Legitimate shifts result from scientifically valid
recalculations of public health risks as vaccines eradicate or radically attenuate a
disease risk at a societal level. Most famously, smallpox killed about 30% of the
roughly 50 million people globally who contracted the disease each year before
vaccination programs began in earnest in the 1950s.133 As a result of these
vaccination efforts, however, the last natural case of smallpox occurred in 1977.134
The variola virus that causes smallpox now exists only in laboratories, and
“[r]outine smallpox vaccination among the American public stopped in 1972 after
the disease was eradicated in the United States.”135
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Willfredo Lopz, Gene W. Matthes, Mark Rothstein, & Karen Foster, eds.) 262, 263 (2007) (citing
Garrett Hardin, The tragedy of the commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48 (1968)).
130
Palmer, supra note 128; Malone & Hinman, supra note129, at 264 (describing herd immunity
and how the percentage of the vaccinated population required varies by disease).
131
Palmer, supra note 128; Malone & Hinman, supra note129, at 264 (describing herd immunity
and how the percentage of the vaccinated population required varies by disease).
132
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 263.
133
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BUGS, DRUGS, AND SMOKE: STORIES FROM PUBLIC HEALTH 35
(2011),
available
through
https://www.who.int/about/history/publications/public_health_stories/en/.
134
Id. at 3.
135
Vaccine Basics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (as updated July 12, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/vaccine-basics/index.html.
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A less dramatic example of a legitimate regulatory baseline shift occurred with
polio. The polio vaccine exists in two primary forms. The oral polio vaccine is more
effective at preventing polio but carries with it a risk of paralysis, which occurs at
a rate of about 1 in every 2.4 million doses of the vaccine.136 The inactivated polio
vaccine, in contrast, is less effective at preventing polio but carries no risk of
paralysis.137 Of course, polio itself can also cause paralysis and death, and so long
as poliovirus circulated in the United States, the risk of paralysis from the oral
vaccine “was certainly outweighed by the much larger risk for paralysis from wild
polioviruses … .”138 However, successful vaccination programs have eradicated
wild poliovirus from the Western Hemisphere since 1991. As a result, given the
greatly reduced risk of contracting polio itself, in 2000 the CDC’s Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices recommended that public health officials
eliminate the risk of vaccine-caused paralysis by switching to the inactivated polio
vaccine.139
The contemporary Anti-Vaxxer Movement, in contrast, represents an
illegitimate shift in risk perception and hence an example of the regulatory shifting
baseline syndrome, particularly with respect to measles. This syndrome manifests
in personal decisions not to vaccinate based on incorrect or exaggerated perceptions
of risk to personal health from the vaccines themselves, particularly childhood
vaccines, often coupled with assertions of individual liberty or religious rights.
However, this shift in risk perception and personal unwillingness to participate in
vaccination programs has been possible on a large scale only because of the very
success of 20th-century vaccination programs and requirements—that is, because
at least two generations of Americans have had the luxury of forgetting what it is
like to live with the constant threat of contracting and dying from last century’s
dread diseases. As a result of that generational amnesia, however, the diseases in
question—especially measles—are starting to return.
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B. Vaccination Regulation in the U.S. into the Late 20th Century
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Immunization practices have existed since the 18th century, when English
physician Edward Jenner used cowpox to inoculate patients against smallpox.140
Louis Pasteur added the human rabies vaccine in 1885, along with the concept of
virus attenuation,141 which allows humans to develop an effective immune response
to the disease without contracting the disease itself. Polio, diphtheria, tetanus, and

136

Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 264.
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Stephanie F. Cave, The History of Vaccinations in the Light of the Autism Epidemic, 14
ALTERNATIVE THERAPIES 54, 54 (2008).
141
Id.
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pertussis vaccines followed by 1946, but injectable vaccines were not invented until
1955.142
With this last invention, vaccination programs backed by public health
regulatory regimes became important public health initiatives in the United States
from the mid-20th century.143 Since the inception of these vaccination programs,
“scientists [have] widely consider[ed] immunization to be one of the greatest public
health achievements of the 20th century, and experts and medical science and
research agree that timely immunization is vital to staying healthy.”144
Federal Vaccination Programs
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The federal contribution to immunization most often consists of financing
programs that make widespread vaccination cheap or free. For example, the first
federal vaccination program targeted polio,145 and the Poliomyelitis Vaccination
Assistance Act of 1955146 spurred free mass vaccination by providing federal funds
to states to pay for the vaccines.147 The Act also allowed the Surgeon General to
initiate federal polio vaccination delivery, as well.148
The federal government continues to financially support vaccination programs,
especially childhood vaccination programs, on a significant scale. Most notably:
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Since 1962, the federal government has supported childhood
vaccination programs through a grant program administered by the
CDC. These “317” grants, named for the authorizing statute, support
purchase of vaccine for free administration at local health
departments and support immunization delivery, surveillance, and
communication and education.149

2.
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Between these 317 grants and the 1994 Vaccines for Children program (discussed
below), “[a]s of 2000, the CDC purchased over half the childhood vaccine
administered in the United States … .”150
State Vaccination Requirements for School Attendance
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a. State Authority to Require Vaccines
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Id.
Id.
144
IVaccinate, Vaccines Are Effective, MICH. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2019),
https://ivaccinate.org/about-vaccines/vaccines-are-effective/
145
Id.
146
Act of August 12, 1955, Pub. L. No. 377, 69 Stat. 704.
147
Id. §§ 3-6.
148
Id. § 7.
149
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 268.
150
Id.
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The key regulatory component of vaccine program efficacy in the United States
are state requirements that children be vaccinated before they can attend public
schools, and often also private schools and daycare facilities.151 Massachusetts
enacted the first law mandating vaccination in 1809, then enacted the first school
vaccination requirement in the 1855 “to prevent smallpox transmission in
schools.”152 In 1905, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,153 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Massachusetts’ (and other states’) authority to mandate vaccinations,
removing federal constitutional Due Process obstacles to state vaccination laws.
Specifically, the Court acknowledged that states have broad police power authority
to protect public health154 and that Jacobson’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty
protections did not insulate him from those requirements:
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the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis
organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society
based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be
confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not
exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of
each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person
or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.155
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Moreover, “Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which
threatens the safety of its members.”156
Seventeen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly addressed the City of
San Antonio, Texas’s school vaccination mandate in Zucht v. King.157 Unlike in
Jacobson, there was no imminent threat of contagious disease in San Antonio;
nevertheless, public officials barred Rosalyn Zucht from attending both public and
private schools because she did not have the required vaccination certificate and
151
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State Vaccination Requirements, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated
Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/state-reqs.html; see also Malone
& Hinman, supra note 129, at 269 (“School vaccination laws have played a key role in the control
of vaccine-preventable diseases in the United States.”).
152
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 269, 271 (citation omitted).
153
197 U.S. 11 (1905). For the story of how resistance to smallpox vaccine mandates and the fiveyear stretch of smallpox epidemics that started in 1900 led to this Supreme Court case, see generally
MICHAEL WILLRICH, POX: AN AMERICAN STORY (Penguin ed. 2012).
154
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24-25.
155
Id. at 26.
156
Id. at 27.
157
260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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refused to get vaccinated.158 Relying on Jacobson, the Court found against Zucht
in three paragraphs, concluding that “it is within the police power of a state to
provide for compulsory vaccination” and “that a state may, consistently with the
federal Constitution, delegate to a municipality authority to determine under what
conditions health regulations shall become operative.”159
b. The Eventual Universality of School Vaccination Mandates
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Court was considering
Jacobson, “nearly half the states had requirements for children to be vaccinated
before they entered school. By 1963, when the measles vaccine became
available,[160] 20 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had such laws,
with a variety of vaccines being mandated.”161
Measles became a critical focus in the expansion of state vaccination mandates
in the later 1960s, as the United States sought to eradicate that disease, and “[t]hese
experiences demonstrated that mandatory vaccination could be enforced and was
effective.”162 In 1977, public health officials pursued a nationwide Childhood
Immunization Initiative to increase measles vaccination levels in children to 90
percent by 1979, an effort that induced even more states to enact and enforce school
vaccination requirements.163
School vaccination requirements, when strictly enforced, are quite effective in
preventing disease.164 As a result, “[b]y the 1980-1981 school year, all 50 states
had laws covering students first entering school,”165 by 1983 all 50 states required
measles vaccinations,166 and “[a]s of the 1998-1999 school year, all states but four
(Louisiana, Michigan, South Carolina, and West Virginia) had requirements
covering all grades from kindergarten through 12th grade.”167 By that point, “[t]he
requirements covered diphtheria toxoid and polio, measles, and rubella vaccines in
all 50 states; 49 states required tetanus toxoid, 46 required mumps vaccine, 44
required pertussis vaccine, and 28 required hepatitis B vaccine.”168 In 2000, the
Task Force on Community Preventive Services, an independent body that evaluates
the effectiveness of public health preventive interventions, recommended the use
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Id. at 175.
Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
160
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 271.
161
Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
162
Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
163
Id. (citations omitted).
164
Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
165
Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
166
Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
167
Id. (citations omitted).
168
Id. (citations omitted).
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of mandatory vaccination requirements to drastically reduce the incidence of
vaccine-preventable diseases.169
C. Initial Signals of a Regulatory Shifting Baseline Syndrome:
Vaccine Lawsuits, the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, and State
Vaccine Exemptions
1.

Vaccine Litigation and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
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No vaccine is risk-free,170 even when properly manufactured and
administered.171 As noted, the oral polio vaccine can cause paralysis.172 More
commonly, the person getting vaccinated faces risks of some sort of immune
reaction, ranging from redness and soreness at the vaccine site to a severe allergic
reaction that leads to anaphylactic shock and death.173
In the United States currently, the initial regulatory regime to balance these risks
personal harm against a new vaccine’s effectiveness in protecting public health is
the Food & Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) evaluation pursuant to the drug
provisions of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).174 The federal
government has been regulating vaccines since the passage of the 1902 Biologics
Control Act,175 which gave authority to the Marine Health Service’s Laboratory of
Hygiene (transformed in 1930 into the National Institutes of Health) authority to
regulate vaccines for safety, purity, and potency.176 “The Laboratory established
standards and licensed smallpox and rabies vaccines,” then in 1934 added standards
for efficacy.177
Although Congress enacted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938,178 the
FDA did not have authority over vaccines until 1972, when “the Division of
Biologics Standards was moved from the National Institutes of Health to the
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Id. (citing Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Recommendations regarding
interventions to improve vaccination coverage in children, adolescents, and adults, 18 AMER. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 92, 92-96 (2000)).
170
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273.
171
Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution
to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 149 (1988) (citations omitted).
172
Id. at 150.
173
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., last
reviewed Jan. 2021, https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html
174
21 U.S.C. §§301-399a.
175
Linda Bren, The Road to the Biotech Revolution—Highlights from 100 Years of Biologics
Regulation.
FDA
CONSUMER
1,
1
(2006),
available
at
https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/The-Road-to-the-Biotech-Revolution-Highlights-of-100-Years-of-Biologics-Regulation.pdf; Julie B. Milstein, Regulation of vaccines:
strengthening the science base, 25 J. PUBLIC HEALTH POL’Y 173, 174 (2004).
176
Milstein, supra note 175175, at 174, 176.
177
Id. at 176.
178
Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399gg.
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FDA.”179 The FDCA drug approval regime has received more public attention than
normal during the coronavirus pandemic, but a concise overview is still helpful.
Under the Act, a “drug” includes any article “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” in humans.180 Since 1962, the
FDCA has prevented the introduction of any new drug in the United States without
the FDA’s approval,181 which since 1972 has include vaccines.182 To get that
approval, the manufacturer must prove that a new vaccine is both safe and
effective.183
However, drug and vaccine “safety” is not absolute but instead requires the
FDA to assess whether the benefits of the drug outweigh its risks, a calculus that
depends on many factors and under which the FDA might be willing to tolerate
more individual risks and side effects if the vaccine prevents a particularly deadly
or novel disease.184 Any patient who has received warnings about contraindications
and side effects from their doctor or pharmacy in connection with a prescription,
flu vaccine, or now the new coronavirus vaccines has experienced firsthand the
practical results of FDA risk-benefit balancing.
Thus, individual risks usually remain for even the most important and effective
vaccines. One of the first signs that members of the U.S. public were beginning to
reject the public-oriented focus of vaccination programs185 were the products
liability torts lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers beginning in the 1950s and
escalating through the 1980s,186 seeking personal injury damages for those
individuals that vaccines harmed. These lawsuits began with the Cutter Incident, in
which Cutter Laboratories released lots of the Salk polio vaccine in which the virus
had not been properly inactivated despite the fact that Cutter followed federally
mandated manufacturing procedures. About 200 people were paralyzed and ten
people died as a result of contracting polio from vaccines from these lots. In 1955,
the California Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict that Cutter Laboratories was
liable in tort for these injuries under implied warranty theories, despite the fact that
the jury explicitly found that Cutter had not been negligent in producing the
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Milstein, supra note 175, at 177.
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (emphasis added).
181
Id. § 355(a).
182
Milstein, supra note 175175, at 177.
183
21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
184
See id. § 355-1(a)(1) (laying out the risk-benefit analysis and many of the factors to consider).
185
Miles E. Coleman, An Overview of the National Childhood Vaccination Act, 21 S.C. Lawyer 40,
40 (2010) (“Throughout the 20th century, as vaccination schedules prescribed more and earlier
immunizations, there was a growing awareness of the potential dangers of vaccinations and an
accompanying resistance to immunization. In response, Congress passed the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986”).
186
Neraas, supra note 171, at 151 (“Lawsuits against manufacturers rose from 24 in 1980 to
approximately 150 in 1985.”).
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vaccine.187 The proverbial tort floodgates had been opened, and vaccine litigation
threatened to leave the United States without vaccine manufacturers.188
Responding to this “vaccine liability crisis that has threatened the nation’s
supply of childhood vaccines,”189 Congress intervened with National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA), which established the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program (VICP).190 This program provides compensation to
the patients who are injured by listed vaccines191 while insulating vaccine
manufacturers from tort liability,192 ensuring that vaccines remain available to the
population at large. A person who receives a covered vaccine and suffers a
recognized injury therefrom193 files a petition for recovery in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims,194 receiving compensation as the Act allows.195 According to the
U.S. Department of Justice, “Over the past 30 years, the VICP has succeeded in
providing a less adversarial, less expensive, and less time-consuming system of
recovery than the traditional tort system that governs medical malpractice, personal
injury, and product liability cases. More than 6,000 people have been paid in excess
of $3.9 billion (combined) since the Program’s 1988 inception,” and “costly
litigation against drug manufacturers and health care professionals who administer
vaccines has virtually ceased.”196

a. Increasing Numbers of State Exemptions from School Vaccination
Requirements

187
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The NCVIA ensured that childhood vaccines remained available in the United
States. Nevertheless, changes to state vaccination requirements increasingly
allowed anti-vaxxers to pursue their individual personal inclinations, allowing
disease like measles to re-emerge.

Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322-24 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1955).
Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs, COLL. PHYSICIANS PHILADELPHIA, as updated Jan. 17,
2018, https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-injury-compensation-programs;
see also Neraas, supra mote 171, at 152 (“Between 1966 and 1977, half the nation’s vaccine
manufacturers stopped producing and distributing vaccines. By 1985, only four commercial firms
produced and distributed the primary vaccines used in compulsory vaccination programs.”).
189
Neraas, supra note 171, at 149.
190
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-23.
191
Id. §§ 300aa-10(a), 300aa-11(c), 300aa-13(a).
192
Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232-33 (2011) (holding that the
NCVIA preempts state tort law design defect claims).
193
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14.
194
Id. § 300aa-11.
195
Id. § 300aa-15.
196
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (updated Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/vicp.
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Exemptions from state vaccination requirements have been part of the legal
vaccination landscape almost from the beginning. Even in the 19th century, for
example, Massachusetts’ vaccination laws allowed “an exception in favor of
‘children who present a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that they are
unfit subjects for vaccination.’ ”197 Medical exemptions from vaccination continue
to find support among public health officials, because “[s]ome people have medical
conditions that increase the risk for adverse effect, and therefore they should not
receive vaccines. Recognizing this fact, all state vaccination laws provide for
exemptions for persons with contraindicating conditions.”198 Utah’s medical
exemption is fairly typical. While Utah requires students to have a certificate of
immunization to attend any “public, private, or parochial kindergarten, elementary,
or secondary school through grade 12, nursery school, licensed day care center,
child care facility, family care home, or head-start program,”199 children can avoid
this requirement if they have a physician’s certification that a health condition
prevents the child from receiving the vaccine.200
The two other exemptions that emerged in states over time—exemptions for
religious reasons and exemptions based on personal philosophy—are far less wellgrounded in medicine but instead seek to accommodate other, individual, values.
The policy and legal issue they raise for contemporary society and the resurgence
of diseases like measles is whether these personal exemptions should trump the
greater public good.
b. Personal Philosophical Exemptions from Vaccine Requirements
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Personal philosophical exemptions from vaccination requirements allow
parents to avoid the school vaccination requirements for their child on the basis of
personal or moral beliefs.201 These exemptions originated in the British
Vaccination Act of 1898, which “provided a conscience clause to allow exemptions
to mandatory smallpox vaccination. This clause gave rise to the term ‘conscientious
objector,’ which later came to refer to those opposed to military service.”202
Philosophic objections to mandatory vaccination can hark back to Jacobson’s
objection to this basic infringement on liberty, arise from a fear of an adverse
reaction to or contamination from the vaccines, or reflect the parents’ conclusions
197
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Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12 (citing MASS. REV. L. chap. 75, § 139). Massachusetts added its medical
exemption in 1894. Douglas S. Diekema, Personal Belief Exemptions for School Vaccination
Requirements, 35 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 275, 278 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevpublhealth-032013-182452.
198
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273.
199
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-301 (2020).
200
Id. §53A-11-302.
201
States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements,
NATL. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx
202
Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (updated Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions.
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that their children really aren’t at risk of contracting particular diseases or that the
diseases for which vaccinations are required really aren’t that bad.203
States were actively adopting philosophical exemptions between 1970, when
only “five state allowed exemption from the law if a parent simply objected in
writing,”204 and 2014. By the beginning of 21st century, 15 states provided
exemptions for personal philosophical objections—California, Colorado, Idaho,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.205 By 2014, the number
had risen to 22, subtracting New Mexico but adding Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri
(childcare facilities only), Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia (HPV vaccine
only), and Wisconsin.206 Moreover, use of these exemptions more than doubled.207
States phrase these exemptions a variety of ways. Harkening back to England,
Texas allows the exemption if a parent cites “reasons of conscience.”208 Arizona,
in turn, requires that:
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The parent or guardian of the pupil submits a signed statement to the
school administrator stating that the parent or guardian has received
information about immunizations provided by the department of
health services and understands the risks and benefits of
immunizations and the potential risks of nonimmunization and that
due to personal beliefs, the parent or guardian does not consent to
the immunization of the pupil.209
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Despite their early 21st-century popularity, however, states can easily eliminate
philosophical exemptions. As Jacobson and Zucht make clear, these exemptions
exist purely as a matter of the state’s largesse, politically accommodating parents
who prefer not to vaccinate their children, often as a result of unwarranted concerns
about the vaccines.

Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273.
Diekema, supra note 197, at 279
205
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273.
206
This list combines information from States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From
School Immunization Requirements, NATL. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx, with that
web site’s prior incarnation, States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School
Immunization Requirements, Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (June 26, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. See also
Vaccination
Exemptions,
HISTORY
OF
VACCINES
(updated
Jan.
7,
2018),
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions
(also
counting 20 states before California’s and Vermont’s changes in 2015).
207
Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (updated Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions.
208
TEX. EDU CODE ANN. § 38.001.
209
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-873(A)(1).
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State exemptions from vaccine requirements for religious reasons are both more
pervasive and potentially more legally and politically difficult to remove, given the
Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.210 The
Christian Science Church was particularly active in lobbying for religious
exemptions in the 20th century, and by 1970 “most states allowed exemption from
school vaccine requirements … if the parents could demonstrate that the
vaccination would violate the teachings of a recognized religious organization to
which they belonged … .”211
The U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether the First
Amendment—or, since 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act212—requires
a religious exemption from mandatory vaccination laws. Indeed, it has signaled just
the opposite: when offered the opportunity, the Court has gone out of its way to
suggest that vaccine mandates are insulated from claims of religion freedom. For
example, its 1944 case of Prince v. Massachusetts addressed the issue of whether a
Jehovah’s Witness could violate child labor laws on religious grounds.213 Along the
way to upholding Massachusetts’ conviction of the parent, the Court emphasized
that:

210

tn

ot

neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s
labor, and in many other ways. … Thus, he cannot claim freedom
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death.214
U.S. CONST., amend. I.
Diekema, supra note 197, at 279.
212
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
213
321 U.S. 158, 159-60 (1944).
214
Id. at 166-67 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Indeed, even in 1972 in one of the most
important cases upholding religious freedom against state schooling requirements, the Supreme
Court still emphasized that the case was “not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be
properly inferred,” again insulating the decision from directly intruding into public health mandates.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). Moreover, the U.S. Courts of Appeals recently have
nearly uniformly upheld vaccine mandates against religious freedom claims. See, e.g., Fallon v.
Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 492-93 (3rd Cir. 2017)
(holding that a hospital worker’s refusal to comply with a flu vaccination requirement did not give
rise to a religious discrimination claim and noting that “that we are not the only court to come to the
conclusion that certain anti-vaccination beliefs are not religious”); Phillips v. City of New York,
775 F.3d 538, 542-44 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding New York’s application of its religious exemption
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Seventy years later, in 2014, a very different Court displayed the same reluctance
to subject vaccination mandates (or, more technically, requirements that medical
insurance cover the vaccinations) to the vagaries of individual religious beliefs. In
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court determined that federal mandates
in the Affordable Care Act requiring that employers provide health insurance that
covers contraception, to which the employers involved objected on religious
grounds, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.215 While the case had
nothing directly to do with vaccination, along the way to its decision (prompted by
the Department of Health and Human Services), the Court majority made clear that
its decision did not necessarily extend to vaccines:
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Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurancecoverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an
employer’s religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as
immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example,
the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve
different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing
them.216

tn

ot

Even the Supreme Court’s most recent coronavirus-related religious freedom
case, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,217 does not necessarily
subject vaccination requirements to constitutional or statutory claims of religious
freedom. The case upheld a religious freedom First Amendment challenge to the
New York Governor’s executive order limiting religious services in “red” and
“orange” zones to 10 and 25 attendees, respectively.218 The Court emphasized that
the executive order imposed no such crowding limitations on “essential”
businesses like liquor and hardware stores, nor did it tailor attendance limitations
to the size of the church or synagogue,219 constitutionally suspect differentiations
that a vaccination mandate is unlikely to make. In addition, Justices Breyer,
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against challenges from parents seeking exemptions on non-religious grounds); Caviezel v. Great
Neck Public Schools, 500 Fed. Appx. 16, 18-19 (2d. Cir. 2012) (upholding a New York denial of a
religious exemption); Workman v. Mingo Co. Bd. Education, 419 Fed. Appx. 348, 354-56 (4th Cir.
2011) (upholding West Virginia’s lack of a religious exemption).
215
573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).
216
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 733 (emphasis added. In addition, as the Court explained at length, the
application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to state mandates created a separate set of
constitutional issues, leading to the Court invalidating Congress’s original attempt to do so pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 693-96 (explaining City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997)).
217
--- U.S. --- 114 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
218
Id. at 66.
219
Id. at 66-67.
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Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented on the merits regardless,220 and both Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, who voted in the majority, wrote concurring opinions that
suggest that they might see a vaccination case differently—Justice Gorsuch
explicitly suggesting that the vaccine requirement in Jacobson might survive strict
scrutiny,221 Justice Kavanaugh emphasizing the “substantial deference” owed to
state policy choices during pandemics.222
In the few cases that exist, State supreme Court explicitly ruled against religious
freedom claims and upheld vaccine mandates.223 Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme
Court went so far as to strike down the legislature’s attempted religious exemption
on grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.224 Tipping its hand, it first asked, “Is it mandated by the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution that innocent children, too young to decide for
themselves, are to be denied the protection against crippling and death that
immunization provides because of a religious belief adhered to by a parent or
parents?”225 The specter of children suffering “the horrors of crippling and death
resulting from poliomyelitis or smallpox or from one of the other diseases against
which means of immunization are known and have long been practiced
successfully” haunts the rest of the opinion.226
Nevertheless, despite the apparent lack of constitutional or statutory
requirement, the vast majority of states avoided Mississippi’s haunting. By the
beginning of the 21st century, 48 states—all but Mississippi and West Virginia—
allowed exemptions from mandatory school vaccination requirements on religious
grounds.227

ot

d. Correlations Between Exemptions and Reduced Vaccination Rates

220
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The non-medical exemptions from state school vaccination requirements
allowed Anti-Vaxxers considerable latitude to exercise their individual choices—
with consequences to public health. To be sure, into the 21st century nationwide
vaccination rates remained high.228 Nevertheless, of the seven states where more
than 1% of students used exemptions in the 1997-1998 school year, four—
Colorado, Michigan, Utah, and Washington—had philosophical exemptions.229

Pr

ep

rin

Id. at 76-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts dissented on grounds of mootness. Id.
at 75-76 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
221
Id. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
222
Id. at 73-74 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring.
223
E.g., Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ark. 1965).
224
Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 233 (Miss. 1979).
225
Id. at 221.
226
Id. at 222-23. See also Dalli v. Board of Education, 267 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971) (striking
down Massachusetts’ religious exemption on Equal Protection grounds because it favored some
religions over others).
227
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273.
228
Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
229
Id.
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Moreover, pockets of non-vaccination began to emerge at the community scale, and
“in some communities, the levels of exemptors may be as high as 5%. In 1995, 84%
of California schools had fewer than 1% of students with exemptions, but 4% of
schools had 5% or more with exemptions.”230 The State of Washington, which
allows all three kinds of exemptions, had “an overall exemption rate of 5.2% in the
2014-15 school year.”231 Overall, between the 2011-2012 school year and the 20172018 school, use of non-medical exemptions for school vaccination requirements
has continued to increase, with some states seeing the vaccination rates for
kindergarteners entering school in Fall 2017 as low as 81.3%.232
Starting in the late 1980s, exemptions from vaccination also increasingly
correlated to increased risk of measles, particularly in religious communities, such
as the Amish. “Salmon et al. found that persons with documented religious or
philosophic exemptions were 35 times more likely to contract measles than were
vaccinated persons during 1985-1992. They also found that persons living in
communities with high concentrations of exemptors were themselves at increased
risk for measles because of increased risk for exposure.”233
Thus, individual choices to seek exemptions from state vaccine mandates fairly
quickly began to impact the public health commons as well as the exemptors
themselves. It also become clear that legal design was an important factor in
individuals’ decisions to exploit an exemption: states with complicated processes
for obtaining their religious and philosophical exemptions maintained high rates of
student vaccination, while one-third of the states with simple procedures had their
exemption rates exceed 1% of students.234

1.

ot

D. The Regulatory Shifting Baseline Syndrome and Anti-Vaxxers
Anti-Vaxxers in the United States
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Resistance to vaccination has existed since inoculations were first invented.
Indeed, skepticism regarding the efficacy and safety of the earliest inoculation
practices was often fully justified, given the state of medical science and rather
loose oversight of practitioners at the time.235 For example, when smallpox was the
disease of biggest concern:

230

Id. (citation omitted).
Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (updated Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions.
232
Robert A. Bednarczyk, Adrian R. King, Ariana Lahijani, & Saad B. Omer, Current landscape of
nonmedical vaccination exemptions in the United States: Impact of Policy changes, 18 EXPERT REV.
VACCINES 175, 178 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1080/14760584.2019.1562344.
233
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).
234
Id.
235
The anti-vaccination movement, MEASLES & RUBELLA INITIATIVE (viewed Jan. 27, 2021),
https://measlesrubellainitiative.org/anti-vaccination-movement/.
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In the late 1800s through the early 1900s, some parents responded
to school vaccination laws by refusing to send their children to
school, sending their children to private schools, wiping the vaccine
from their children's arms following vaccination, attempting to fake
vaccine scars, and refusing to comply with vaccination
requirements. This resistance was driven in part by the risks of the
smallpox vaccine and the risks of inoculation, which included the
transmission of other diseases, including tetanus. … Opposition to
vaccination became stronger during the early 1900s when a milder
form of smallpox, variola minor, became the dominant strain. This
strain rarely caused death, leading many to conclude that the vaccine
was more dangerous than the disease it prevented.236
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The United States, however, has a long history of vaccine resistance rooted in
issues other than legitimate concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccines
themselves.237 Many religions and religious leaders, for example, have actively
discouraged vaccination: “fear of vaccines emerged in the 18th century. Religious
figureheads often referred to them as ‘the devil’s work’ and actively spoke against
them.”238 Racism and racial mistrust have played a role in vaccination resistance.239
Personal liberty objections have also long been important in both England and the
United States. For example, when England enacted the Vaccinated Act in 1853,
requiring vaccination against smallpox for infants up to three months old and
mandating penalties for noncompliance, several organizations formed to resist the
new mandate, including London’s Anti-Vaccination League.240 In the United
States, opposition to vaccination mandates reflected uneasiness over the increasing
intrusion of government into private lives, arguably constituting one of the first
civil liberty struggles.241 “Parents also protested on the grounds that vaccination
threatened the safety of their children, usurped their parental authority, and violated
the bodily integrity of their children.”242
Current opposition to vaccines in the United States is generally categorized into
two levels of severity. Some people are still resistant to vaccinating themselves and
their children. This resistance is known as “vaccine hesitancy,” and it affects
“motivation, causing people to reject it for themselves or their children…[leading
236

Diekema, supra note197, at 278 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., WILLRICH, supra note 153, at 12 (noting that “reasonable health concerns do not alone
explain the widespread opposition to compulsory vaccination at the turn of the twentieth century.”).
238
Olivia Benecke & Sarah Elizabeth DeYoung, Anti-Vaccine Decision-Making and Measles
Resurgence in the United States, 6 GLOBAL PEDIATRIC HEALTH 2333794X19862949 (2019)
[online], doi: 10.1177/2333794X19862949. See also WILLRICH, supra note 153, at 12 (“Christian
Scientists viewed compulsory vaccination as a violation of religious freedom.”).
239
WILLRICH, supra note 153, at 12.
240
Id.; The anti-vaccination movement, MEASLES & RUBELLA INITIATIVE (viewed Jan. 27, 2021),
https://measlesrubellainitiative.org/anti-vaccination-movement/.
241
WILLRICH, supra note 153, at 13-24.
242
Diekema, supra note 197, at 278.
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to the] undermine[d] vaccination coverage in specific settings.”243 An “antivaxxer,” in turn, is an individual who is outright opposed to vaccinations for various
reasons.244 These individuals typically associate with the “anti-vaccination
movement,” or “anti-vaxxer movement,” in an effort to prevent the use of vaccines
to immunize people from certain contagious illnesses.245
With the spectrum of resistance is real, people along the entire spectrum often
now find justification for their resistance in misleading and false information that
has made the personal risks from the vaccines themselves seem unduly high. For
example, “[i]n the 1970s, concern about the possibility of pertussis vaccine causing
sudden infant death syndrome or infantile spasms led to debate about pertussis
vaccination requirements, even though studies showed that the vaccine caused
neither event.”246 Nevertheless, these fears led to an especially substantial
expansion of the Anti-Vaxxer Movement in the United Kingdom into the 1980s,
“when parents increasingly refused to vaccinate their children against pertussis in
response to a report that attributed 36 negative neurological reactions to the
pertussis vaccine. This caused a decrease in the pertussis vaccine uptake in the
United Kingdom from 81% in 1974 to 31% in 1980, eventually resulting in a
pertussis outbreak … .”247

243
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ot

Measles is not the deadliest of infectious diseases. Even so, “Before the
introduction of measles vaccine in 1963 and widespread vaccination, major
epidemics occurred approximately every 2–3 years and measles caused an
estimated 2.6 million deaths each year.”248 World population in 1963 was a little
over 3.211 billion people,249 meaning that roughly one out of every 1235
individuals on the planet died from measles every year. In contrast, the rate of
severe allergic reactions to the MMR (mumps-measles-rubella) vaccine is about
one in 1 million doses.250 It was thus roughly 1000 times less risky to get the
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World Health Organization, Improving vaccination demand and addressing hesitancy, World
Health
Organization
(June
17,
2020),
http://awareness.who.int/immunization/programmes_systems/vaccine_hesitancy/en/.
244
Thomas Keegan & Rhiannon Edge, It’s wrong to assume that the choice not to vaccinate is
always down to ignorance, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 16, 2016). https://theconversation.com/itswrong-to-assume-that-the-choice-not-to-vaccinate-is-always-down-to-ignorance-123112.
245
The
anti-vaccination
movement,
MEASLES
&
RUBELLA
INITIATIVE,
https://measlesrubellainitiative.org/anti-vaccination-movement/ (last visited June 24, 2020).
246
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 274.
247
Benecke & DeYoung, supra note 238.
248
World Health Organization, Measles (5 Dec. 2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/measles.
249
World Population by Year, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/worldpopulation/world-population-by-year/ (as viewed Jan. 23, 2021).
250
Jeanne P. Spencer, Ruth H. Trondsen Pawlowski, & Stephanie Thomas, Vaccine Adverse Events:
Separating Myth from Reality, 95 AMER. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 786, 787 tbl. 1 (2017).
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measles vaccine than to walk around unvaccinated even in just the year of
vaccination, let alone over a lifetime.
That calculus has changed. Even in a bad year, measles now causes only
about 140,000 deaths globally,251 reflecting a reduction in yearly measles deaths
since 1963 of over 94% despite a world population that has more than doubled in
the interim. Nevertheless, with the rare exception of a disease like smallpox that
now exists only in laboratories, vaccination remains necessary to protect the public
commons, as the 2000 polio recommendation suggests and—given its infection
rate—remains particularly true for measles.
Anti-Vaxxer resistance to measles vaccines, however, got an unfortunate
boost from the false linking of the MMR vaccine to autism, unfortunately given
credence “by the 1998 publication of a series of articles in The Lancet by a former
British doctor, Andrew Wakefield..”252 “Despite the small sample size (n=12), the
uncontrolled design, and the speculative nature of the conclusions, the paper
received wide publicity, and MMR vaccination rates began to drop because parents
were concerned about the risk of autism after vaccination.”253 Recent research
indicates that the fraudulent research continues to influence parents’ decisions to
not vaccinate their children, particularly as the internet and social media become
increasingly popular sources of “medical” advice.254
Thus, the regulatory baseline for MMR vaccine has illegitimately shifted, and
expanded exemptions from state vaccination mandates played a critical role in
allowing individual choices to once again endanger public health.255 Children (and
others) are paying the price.

ot

E. The Resumption of Vaccine Requirements, with a Note on the
Coronavirus Pandemic

251
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Incidents like the Lancet fraud and the low vaccination rates in some states in
2017 illuminate how far the public’s risk perception baseline has shifted from the
vaccine-preventable diseases to the vaccines themselves, warranting restoration of
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World Health Organization, Measles (5 Dec. 2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/measles.
252
Benecke & DeYoung, supra note 238. The critical paper was Andrew J. Wakefield et al., Ileallymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental disorder in
children, 351 LANCET 637, 637-41 (1998) (retracted by the journal for fraud in March 2010).
253
T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao & Chittaranjan Andrade, The MMR vaccine and autism: Sensation,
refutation, retraction, and fraud, 53 INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 95, 95 (2011), doi: 10.4103/00195545.82529.
254
Lucy E Elkin, Susan R.H. Pullon, & Maria H. Stubbe, ‘Should I vaccinate my child?’ Comparing
the displayed stances of vaccine information retrieved from Google, Facebook and YouTube, 38
VACCINE 2772, 2771 (2020) (citations omitted), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2020.02.041;
Benecke & DeYoung, supra note 238. For a particularly pointed internet response to anti-vaxxer
rhetoric, see Rada Jones, 24 reasons not to vaccinate your kid, KEVINMD.COM (Jan. 25, 2020),
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2020/01/24-reasons-to-not-vaccinate-your-kid.html.
255
Benecke & DeYoung, supra note 238; Diekema, supra note 197, at 283-84.
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regulatory regimes’ full strength. Fortunately, in the United States, resurgences of
diseases thought long vanquished, like measles, have inspired governments to once
again strengthen their vaccine programs and requirements, suggesting that disease
resurgence is reactivating cultural memory and at least partially correcting this
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome.
1.

The Federal Government’s Response to Measles Resurgence

The States’ Responses to Measles Resurgence
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Although vaccination levels in schoolchildren during the 1980s were 90% or
higher as a result of the new school vaccination requirements, rates among
preschool children were significantly lower.256 The result was a measles resurgence
in 1989-1991, “primarily affecting unvaccinated preschool-aged children,”257 that
resulted in 55,000 reported cases. In response, Congress created the Vaccines for
Children Program258 through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.259
The program lasted a decade, between 1994 and 2013. Under it “all Medicaideligible children, all children who are uninsured, all American Indian and Alaska
Native children, and insured children whose coverage does not include vaccinations
(with limitations on the locations where this last group can receive VFC vaccine)
qualify to receive routine childhood vaccines at no cost for the vaccine.”260
In 2014, the CDC analyzed this program and concluded that it was a rousing
success.261 Thus, the Vaccines for Children Program indicates that stepped-up
federal financing of vaccination can be one effective corrective to Anti-Vaxxer
sentiments.
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Resurgences of diseases like measles have also led some states to re-think their
exemptions from school vaccination requirements. In response to the 2014-2015
measles outbreak, for example, several states revisited their vaccination laws. In
2015, “Vermont became the first state to repeal its personal belief exemption,”
followed by California, which “removed exemptions based on personal beliefs,
which are defined in that state as also including religious objections.”262 Other
256

Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 270.
Id.
258
Cynthia G. Whitney, Fangjun Zhou, James Singleton, & Anne Schuchat, Benefits from
Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era—United States, 1994–2013,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
(April 25, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a4.htm.
259
Pub. L. No. 103–66, § 13631, 107 Stat. 312 (Aug. 10, 1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396v.
260
Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 268.
261
Whitney et al., supra note 258.
262
States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements,
Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (June 26, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. See also Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES
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states made it more difficult to claim an exemption from the vaccine
requirements—a procedural modification that, as noted above, has been correlated
with significantly lower rates of exemption use. For example, Connecticut
“require[d] an annual, notarized, statement from parents or guardians specifying
religious objection to required vaccinations,” while West Virginia amended its
vaccine legislation to “require[] certification by a licensed physician for medical
exemption requests,” and Illinois “require[d] parents or guardians who claim a
religious exemption to detail their objections for specific immunizations, obtain a
health care provider’s signature, and submit an exemption certificate for each child
before kindergarten, sixth and ninth grade.”263
State amendments to vaccine exemptions have continued. In 2016, both
Michigan and Delaware revisited their school vaccine mandates, with Delaware
weakening its religious exemption.264 In 2017, Indiana required college students
living on campus to be immunized against meningitis, while Utah potentially
eviscerated parental control by allowing minors to consent to their own
vaccinations.265
The 2019 measles outbreak again inspired states to strengthen their vaccine
requirements, especially New York. As noted above, measles cases in 2019
occurred in 31 states, but “75% of cases were linked to outbreaks in New York City
and New York state, most of which were among unvaccinated children in Orthodox
Jewish communities.”266 In response to these measles outbreaks, New York ended
its religious exemption and other exemptions from school vaccine requirements.267
State legislatures in Arkansas, Maine, Washington, Colorado, and Virginia also
responded to the 2019 measles outbreaks. In fairly targeted legislation, Washington
removed “the personal belief exemption for the measles, mumps and rubella
vaccine requirement for public schools, private schools and day care centers..”268
Maine, in contrast, eliminated both its religious and personal belief exemptions,269
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(updated Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccinationexemptions (noting Vermont’s and California’s 2015 law eliminating all non-medical exemptions).
263
States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements,
Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (June 26, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
News Staff, “In Wake of Measles Outbreaks, CDC Updates 2019 Case Totals,” AAFP (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-public/20191009measlesupdt.html.
267
Bobby Allyn, “New York Ends Religious Exemptions for Required Vaccines,” NPR (June 13,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/13/732501865/new-york-advances-bill-ending-religiousexemptions-for-vaccines-amid-health-cris.
268
States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements,
Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx (providing the same information).
269
Id.

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793991

REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME

47

iew
ed

2021

Coronavirus Vaccines and the Anti-Vaxxers

pe

3.

er
r

ev

although these changes do not take effect until September 2021.270 As of 2019,
Arkansas now requires public and private schools to maintain records regarding
vaccination exemption use; in 2020, Colorado established similar requirements and
requires parents claiming a personal or religious exemption to complete an online
education program first.271 Finally, in 2020 Virginia required its school vaccination
requirements to “be consistent with the Immunization Schedule developed and
published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and
the American Academy of Family Physicians.”272
Thus, over the course of six years, state legislatures significantly shifted the
vaccine regulatory baseline back toward public protection. By January 2021, the
number of states with a personal philosophy exemption had dropped back to 15.273
A record five states now have no non-medical exemptions, while several others
made use of the exemptions more difficult, including through education
requirements.274 The cultural memory that school vaccination requirements curb
personal impulses that put the public health at risk appears to be, for the moment,
at least partially re-activated.

270

tn

ot

Before COVID-19 locked down the United States in March 2020, the last
true pandemic in this country was the 1918 H1N1 flu (“Spanish flu) pandemic—
although the 2009 H1N1 flu (“swine flu”) outbreak did considerable damage.275 In
13 months, between January 21, 2020, and February 20, 2021, the coronavirus
pandemic had killed over 495,000 people in the United States and over 2.45 million
worldwide276—levels approaching pre-vaccine death rates from measles. By
February 2021, mass vaccinated against the new disease its early stages even as
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State Vaccination Exemptions for Children Entering Public Schools, PROCON.ORG (Mar. 4,
2020),
https://vaccines.procon.org/state-vaccination-exemptions-for-children-entering-publicschools/.
271
States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements,
Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx (providing the same information).
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Worst Outbreaks in U.S. History, Healthline, as viewed Jan. 27, 2021,
https://www.healthline.com/health/worst-disease-outbreaks-history. “The CDC estimates that there
were 60.8 million cases, 274,304 hospitalizations, and 12,469 deaths in the United States” from the
2009 flu outbreak. Id.
276
United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
as updated Jan. 26, 2021, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_totaldeaths. The exact
count as of January 26, 2021, was 419,827 deaths, reflecting 1891 new deaths from the previous
day. Id.
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public health workers were discovering more virulent mutations of the virus.277
Will the vaccine regulatory baseline syndrome affect the United States’ ability to
effectively combat the pandemic?
Research is mixed as the Article goes to press. On the one hand, early
studies indicate significant resistance to taking the new coronavirus vaccines, even
among healthcare workers.278 Moreover, a 2020 report from the Centre for
Countering Digital Hate indicated that, globally, “social media accounts held by socalled anti-vaxxers have increased their following by at least 7-8 million people
since 2019” and that “31 million people follow anti-vaccine groups on
Facebook.”279 False and misleading rumors about the two approved COVID-19
vaccines are easy to find on the internet and across social media.280 On the other,
other studies indicate that, at least in the United States, political affiliation,
geographic location, distrust of speedy approval processes and foreign vaccines,
and race all appear to be relevant factors in a particular person’s reluctance to
become vaccinated.281 As a result, as coronavirus vaccines roll out, it difficult to
assess whether resistance reflects the more general vaccine regulatory shifting
baseline syndrome at work, whether resistance to coronavirus vaccines is a specific
phenomenon resulting from a particular cultural and political moment that will fade
as 2021 and (hopefully) successful vaccination efforts progress, or a little of both.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”
CONTROVERSY AS A REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME

277
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Can the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome operate more subtly within
statutory regimes to undermine regulatory efficacy? This Part examines the
ongoing “waters of the United States” controversy within the federal Clean Water
Act to suggest that the answer is “yes.”
In 1969, two water pollution events occurred that spurred Congress to increase
the federal involvement in water pollution control: the latest in a century-long series
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COVID-19: Emerging SARS-CoV-2 Variants, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(updated Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/science-andresearch/scientific-brief-emerging-variants.html
278
Liji Thomas, Low acceptance of COVID-19 vaccine among healthcare workers in USA,
MEDICAL NEWS, Jan. 6, 2021, https://www.news-medical.net/news/20210106/Low-acceptance-ofCOVID-19-vaccine-among-healthcare-workers-in-USA.aspx; Stacy Kuebelbeck Paulsen, Who will
accept a COVID-19 vaccine?, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y (Oct 21,
2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/10/who-will-accept-covid-19-vaccine.
279
Talha Burki, The onlne anti-vaccine mavement in the age of COVID-19, THE LANCET DIGITAL
HEALTH [online] (Oct. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S2589-7500(20)30227-2.
280
Dennis Thompson, Anti-Vaxxers Wage Campaigns Against COVID-19 Shots, WEBMD (Jan. 29,
2021),
https://www.webmd.com/vaccines/covid-19-vaccine/news/20210129/anti-vaxxersmounting-internet-campaigns-against-covid-19-shots.
281
Paulsen, supra note 278.
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of Cuyahoga River fires,282 and the Santa Barbara oil spill from an oil drilling
platform.283 Before that, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been relying on the
Refuse Act284 (Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899) to punish people
who polluted the navigable waters, but the statute was an imprecise fit given its
larger focus on preserving navigation.285 In contrast, Congress had been addressing
water quality since 1948 through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, but until
1972 those efforts focused on encouraging states to address water quality,
eventually through setting water quality standards, providing federal money for
sewage treatment works, and providing federal research, limiting the federal
regulatory role to interstate waters and, in 1970, oil spills.286 In 1970, however,
President Richard M. Nixon ordered the brand new Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps to establish a permit program under the Refuse
Act, which the two agencies did within the year.287
In 1972, Congress enacted the contemporary version of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, better known as the Clean Water Act, “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”288
The Act was ambitious, and the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
two federal agencies that implement the Act, as well as states and communities
throughout the Nation, failed to achieve the Act’s many goals on Congress’s
original timeline—universal secondary treatment at publicly owned treatment
works (POTWs or sewage treatment plants by 1977,289 fishable and swimmable
waters by 1983,290 and the elimination of all discharges of pollutants by 1985.291
Nevertheless, Congress’s focus in 1972, and what it eventually did with the
Refuse Act permit program, are important background to the current operations of
the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. One of the core regulatory innovations
of the 1972 Act was to tie previously existing state water quality standards to
federal water quality permitting requirements, in part because of growing
282
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Lorraine Boissoneault, The Cuyahoga River Caught Fire at Least a Dozen Times, but No One
Cared
Until
1969,
SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE,
June
19,
2019,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/cuyahoga-river-caught-fire-least-dozen-times-no-onecared-until-1969-180972444/.
283
Christine Mai-Duc, The 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill changed oil and gas exploration forever,
L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2015, 6:38 PM PT), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santabarbara-oil-spill-1969-20150520-htmlstory.html.
284
33 U.S.C. § 407. For a complete history of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, see ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-27 (2d
ed. ELI 2009); see also Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water
Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 877-79
(1993) (tracing much of this history).
285
CRAIG, supra note 284, at 12 (citations omitted).
286
Id. at 12-21 (citations omitted).
287
Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
288
Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 818 (Oct. 18, 1972), codified as 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
289
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
290
Id. § 1251(a)(2).
291
Id. § 1251(a)(1).
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congressional concerns about the impact of water pollution—itself an abuse of the
public commons—on public health.292
This Part argues that the “waters of the United States” controversy can be
helpfully reframed as an instance of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome.
Specifically, significant progress in addressing the classic “tragedy of the
commons” water pollution problem has allowed property interests to focus courts’
and regulators’ attention on other statutory provisions that allow the Act to interfere
with private property use and states’ primacy in land use planning. In this case,
therefore, identifying the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome in action
illuminates an important statutory design weakness—one that Congress and the two
agencies may simply want to eliminate rather than pursuing yet more rounds of
definitional debate over “waters of the United States.”
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A. U.S. Waterways: From Open Access Resource to Regulated Commons
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Throughout the first two-thirds of the 20th century, rivers in the United States
were as often sources of problems as they were amenities. These classic commons
resources were widely viewed as free waste disposal facilities, and Hardin’s tragedy
was often not long in manifesting itself as riverfront cities industrialized. Damage
to the larger public good was perhaps most obvious when rivers flowing through
and around these cities repeatedly caught fire. Most famously, the Cuyahoga River,
which flows through Cleveland, Ohio, caught fire in 1868, 1883, 1887, 1912, 1922,
1936, 1941, 1948, 1952, and 1969; the last first, although not the worst of the series,
provided one direct impetus to Congress to intervene in water pollution
regulation.293 Until the late 1950s, moreover, residents often viewed the
Cuyahoga’s and other river’s pollution as a sign of progress, even though the
growing water pollution problem could also affect their drinking water:
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The water was nearly always covered in oil slicks, and it bubbled
like a deadly stew. Sometimes rats floated by, their corpses so
bloated they were practically the size of dogs. It was disturbing, but
it was also just one of the realities of the city. For more than a
century, the Cuyahoga River had been prime real estate for various
manufacturing companies. Everyone knew it was polluted, but
pollution meant industry was thriving, the economy was booming,
and everyone had jobs.294

292
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E.g., S. REP. NO.92-214 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671 (Oct. 28, 1971).
Boissoneault, supra note 282.
294
Id. The Clean Water Act does not directly protect drinking water in municipal systems; instead,
the Safe Drinking Water Act performs that function. The attribution of almost all drinking water
improvements, and hence associated public health benefits, to this later Act has generally skewed
cost-benefit analyses of the Clean Water Act. David A. Keiser, Catherine L. King, & Joseph S.
Shapiro, The low but uncertain measured benefits of US water quality policy, 116 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. (PNAS) 5262, 5267 (2019). However, more recent and comprehensive studies better
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Nor was Cleveland alone in dealing with flammable rivers; “Baltimore,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Buffalo and Galveston all used different methods to
disperse oil on their waters in order to prevent fires.”295
Slightly less visibly, rivers also functioned as the United States’ primary sewer
system. This issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court several times in the first half of
the 20th century, particularly when the City of Chicago decided to redirect its raw
sewage away from Lake Michigan (the source of its drinking water) through an
artificial canal system and into the Mississippi River. Downstream Missouri sued
Illinois over the change, first establishing that the Supreme Court had original
jurisdiction over interstate pollution cases296 and then seeking to shut down the
diversion as an interstate nuisance.297 Missouri alleged that “the result of the
threatened discharge would be to send 1,500 tons of poisonous filth daily into the
Mississippi, to deposit great quantities of the same upon the part of the bed of the
last named river belonging to the plaintiff, and so to poison the water of that river,
upon which various of the plaintiff's cities, towns, and inhabitants depended, as to
make it unfit for drinking, agricultural, or manufacturing purposes,”298 particularly
because of an increased risk for typhoid fever.299 While there are many notable
facets of the Supreme Court’s decision that Missouri could not meet its burden of
proof for nuisance, most important for this discussion was the fact that essentially
every city upstream of St Louis—not to mention St. Louis itself—was discharging
its raw sewage into the Mississippi River, making it next to impossible to hold
Chicago and Illinois responsible for any health impacts (which were themselves
difficult to discern).300
In response to a growing environmental consciousness generally, the Cuyahoga
River fire of 1969, the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969, and other impetuses, in 1972
Congress overhauled the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to create the
fundamental structure of what is now known as the Clean Water Act.301 One of the
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account for the pervasive benefits of sewage treatment, which was, at least at the federal level, the
sole domain of the Clean Water Act. See generally David A. Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro,
Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality, 134 QUARTERLY J. ECON.
349 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy019 (focusing specifically on the impacts of the Act’s
sewage treatment grants.
295
Boissoneault, supra note 282.
296
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248-29 (1901).
297
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906).
298
Id.
299
Id. at 522-23.
300
Id. at 525-26. See also New Jersey v. New York, 256 U.S. 296, 313-14 (1921) (holding that New
Jersey had not (yet) proven that New York’s discharges of raw sewage into the Passaic River were
a nuisance). Importantly, however, the Court did protect the first municipal sewage treatment plants
from being enjoined as nuisances themselves, even though their treatment of the raw sewage was
substantially incomplete in many cases. City of Harrisonville, Mo. v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co.,
289 U.S. 334, 337-40 (1933).
301
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388. The name “Clean Water Act” comes from the 1977 amendments. Pub.
L. No. 95-217, § 1, 91 Stat. 1567 (Dec. 27, 1977).
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important but less celebrated features of the statute, for example, was its grant
program to promote the building and upgrading of sewage treatment plants across
the country.302 The Act also limited industrial discharges of pollutants into the
nation’s waterways through two permit programs.303
The Clean Water Act has worked, particularly in terms of addressing the
commons water pollution problems that induced its drafting. In 2019, David Keiser
and Joseph Shapiro published two of the most comprehensive analyses of the Clean
Water Act ever done. Noting that, since 1970, the federal government has spent
over $400 per year for every American “to clean up surface water pollution and
provide clean drinking water,”304 they concluded that “many measures of drinking
and surface water pollution have fallen since the founding of the Environmental
Protection Agency, due at least in part to the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking
Water Act,” although progress remains incomplete.305 Specifically, after analyzing
14.6 million pollution measurements taken at 265,000 monitoring sites between
1972 and 2014, Keiser & Shapiro concluded that “[w]hen the Clean Water Act
passed in 1972, nearly 30 percent of water quality readings were unsafe for fishing,”
while “by 2014, only about 15 percent were unsafe.”306 Grants to upgrade sewage
treatment plants and enforcement of the Act’s National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements (see below) were particularly
important in reducing water pollution.307 More anecdotal evidence also indicates
that the Clean Water Act is still working to make progress in this main mission: In
March 2019, Cuyahoga River fish were deemed safe to eat, and the river hasn’t
caught fire since 1972—although a fuel spill did burn there in August 2020.308
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Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (Oct. 18, 1972), codified as amended as 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511388.
303
33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344; see discussion infra subpart IV.B.
304
David A. Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, US Water Pollution Regulation over the Past Half Century:
Burning Waters to Crystal Springs?, 33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (2019). The Clean Water Act
accounts for about $100 per year of that total. Keiser & Shapiro, Consequences, supra note 294, at
349.
305
Keiser & Shapiro Pollution Regulation, supra note 304, at 53.
306
Id. at 60.
307
Id. See also Keiser & Shapiro, Consequences, supra note 294, at 352 (“We find that each grant
decreases the probability that downriver areas violate standards for being fishable by half a
percentage point. These changes are concentrated within 25 miles downstream of the treatment plant
and they persist for 30 years.”), 373 (“We find large declines in most pollutants that the Clean Water
Act targeted. Dissolved oxygen deficits and the share of waters that are not fishable both decreased
almost every year between 1962 and 1990.”), 374 (“The share of waters that are not fishable fell on
average by about half a percentage point per year, and the share that are not swimmable fell at a
similar rate.”). Notably, because federal sewage treatment grants began before the 1972
amendments, there were often more declines in sewage pollution before 1972 than after it. Id. at
374.
308
Boissoneault, supra note 282.
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Water quality regulation in the United States has always been complicated by
the fact that certain water polluting activities, traditionally the states’ prerogative,
can also interfere with navigation, most emphatically the federal government’s
domain. Thus, by the time Congress overhauled the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in 1972, the Army Corps for decades had been regulating dredging and
filling of the navigable waters pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899309 as a navigation issue. Rivers that can catch on fire are also navigation
issues, and, as noted, when Congress overhauled the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in 1972, the EPA and Army Corps had been operating a Refuse Act
permit program for pollution for almost two years.310
Already, however, Congress was unimpressed. Senate Bill 2770 provided the
initial text of the 1972 amendments. As the Senate Committee on Public Works
noted in October 1971 in its initial report on that bill,
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While the permit program created in late 1970 under the Refuse
Act by the Administrator seeks to establish this direct approach, it
is weak in two important respects: It is being applied only to
industrial polluters, and authority is divided between two Federal
agencies.
Experience with the permit system during the past 10 months
suggests that the machinery used to date may be as cumbersome as
the 1948 abatement procedure. Estimates of the number of permit
applications to be received run as high as 300,000; estimates of the
time required to process the applications run as long as four years.311
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The Senate Committee proposed a single permit program, run by the EPA until
each state could take it over, with permits containing enforceable effluent
limitations.312 Water quality standards would now serve as the metrics of progress
toward achieving water quality goals.313 The Senate bill would have converted
Refuse Act permits to NPDES permits,314 and the new NPDES permit requirement
would also apply to the “at least 40,000” industrial dischargers that the EPA had
identified.315 However, unlike under the Refuse Act, states would take over the
NPDES permit program as they developed the capacity to do so, with federal
oversight of their implementation.316 Most important for this Article, under the
309
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33 U.S.C. § 403.
CRAIG, supra note 284, at 21-22.
311
S. REP. NO.92-214 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672 (Oct. 28, 1971).
312
Id. at 3675-76.
313
Id. at 3675-76.
314
Id. at 3735.
315
Id. at 3736.
316
Id, at 3737-38.
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Senate’s original vision, the NPDES permit program would also largely displace
Army Corps “dredge and fill” permits under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act.317
Drafting wrangling with the House of Representatives, however, led to a
different final compromise. Under Section 402 of the new Act, Refuse Act permits
would still become NPDES permits, and the EPA could eventually delegate
NPDES permitting authority to the states—albeit with several new state
requirements and expanded EPA oversight, including veto authority.318 The House,
however, had inserted a new Section 404 permit program, “for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters.”319 The conference amendment
added new roles for the EPA in this permit program, including giving the EPA
“authority to prohibit specification of a site and use of any site for the disposal of
any dredge or fill material which he determines will adversely affect municipal
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”320 As under the Rivers and Harbors Act,
however, the focus of the Section 404 permit program remained (at least in
Congress’s view) preserving navigation, and the Conference Committee “expected
that … unreasonable restrictions shall not be imposed on dredging activities
essential to the maintenance of interstate and foreign commerce.”321
As a result, the Clean Water Act emerged from Congress with two permit
programs, which have remained in force for almost 50 years. However, the same
regulatory prohibition triggers both: except in compliance with the Clean Water
Act’ requirements, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.”322 The Act defines “the discharge of a pollutant” to be “any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from a point source,”323 where “navigable waters”
are “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”324 The Act defines
“territorial seas” to be the first three miles of ocean,325 but it leaves “the waters of
the United States” undefined. Interpreting “waters of the United States” “has led to
legal debates over how this term applies to roughly half of US waters, primarily
composed of wetlands, headwaters, and intermittent streams.”326 This interpretive
tension vibrates across the two permit programs, with an emphasis on traditional
“navigable waters” making more sense for the Army Corps under section 404, but
a broader interpretation of “waters of the United States” better serving the EPA’s
and Congress’s broader water quality goals in the NPDES program.
317

Id. at 3751-52.
S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3816-18 (Sept. 28, 1972).
319
Id. at 3818-19.
320
Id. at 3820.
321
Id. at 3819.
322
33 U.S.C. §1311(a).
323
Id. § 1362(12).
324
Id. § 1362(7).
325
Id. § 1362(8).
326
Keiser & Shapiro, Pollution Regulation, supra note 304, at 57-58.
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The distinction between the two permit programs lies in exactly what pollutant
the polluter is discharging. If it is dredged or fill material, the polluter is subject to
the Section 404 permit program, which the Army Corps takes lead in
implementing.327 All other dischargers get NPDES permits.328
As the next subpart discusses, the focus of attention between these two permit
programs has shifted over time, and, notably, the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions
problematizing the scope of “waters of the United States” have come in the context
of Section 404 and were decided since 2000, well into the second half of the Act’s
existence. The shift in focus from NPDEs permits to Section 404 permits, not
coincidentally, has allowed the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome to come into
play.

1.

er
r

C. From NPDES to Section 404: The Consequences of Shifting Regulatory
Attention
Overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Clean Water Act Decisions
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Congress’s decision to use the same legal test to trigger both permit programs
is the Clean Water Act’s amnesia-inducing structural feature, because the two
regulatory regimes otherwise resonate in very different webs of rights and values.
As with the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements, the shifting baseline
syndrome is most obvious in Supreme Court opinions. Specifically, when
evaluating “waters of the United States” from inside the Section 404 web, the Court
forgets that what it says that permitting context will simultaneously affect how the
NPDES permit program can operate.
As the Senate Committee originally noted, the primary focus of the 1972
amendments was effectively regulating the 40,000 (at least) industrial dischargers
that the EPA had discovered—the NPDES permit program—rather than on the
Army Corps’ continued oversight of the dredging and filling necessary to preserve
navigation. And, indeed, the EPA and the courts spent a considerable amount of
energy in the first half of the Clean Water Act’s existence, from roughly 1972 to
1997, getting the NPDES permit program up and running.
Nevertheless, the historical progression of U.S. Supreme Court’s limited pool
of decisions about the Clean Water Act suggests a significant shift in regulatory
focus over time. As Table 1 indicates, ten of the Court’s 17 decisions focused on
the Act’s NPDES permit program (almost 60%) occurred in the first half of the
Act’s existence. In contrast, of the Court’s six decisions focused on Section 404,
five (more than 83%) have occurred since 1997. The number increases to six out of
seven decisions (almost 86%) if one considers Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council329 (2009) to be primarily a Section 404 decision.
327
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33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
Id. § 1342(a).
329
557 U.S. 261 (2009).
328
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Table 1: The 40 U.S. Supreme Court Decisions about the Clean Water Act
YEARS
NPDES
Section 404
Decisions
Decisions not
Decisions
Decisions
Involving Involving Permit
Both
Programs
Permit
Programs
NONE

NONE

1977-1981

4

NONE

NONE

1982-1986

2

1997-2001

er
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1
1
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2002-2006

ep

2012-2016

Pr

2017-2020

TOTALS

NONE

NONE

1:

NONE
NONE

• Section 401: 1

1:

• Preemption of
maritime law: 1

SWANCC

2:
Borden Ranch
& Rapanos

2

Coeur Alaska

2:
Decker & Los
Angeles County

NONE

• State nuisance
law: 1
• Jury trial: 1
• Forest Service
plans: 1
• Federal facility
liability: 1
• Section 401
certification: 1
• Attorney fees: 1
NONE

1

tn

1992-1996

2007-2011

NONE

ot

1987-1991

1:

Riverside
Bayview

pe

1

• Sewage treatment
funds: 2
• Radioactive
materia1s: 1
• Interstate nuisance:
1
• Federal common
law preempted: 2
• Civil penalties
don’t trigger
criminal law
protections: 1

ev

1972-1976

2

2:
Sackett &
Hawkes

NONE

County of Maui

NONE

Where to
challenge
WOTUS regs

NONE

17

6

2

15

1:

1:

NONE
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In addition to shifting focus to the Section 404 context, the Court’s decisions
regarding the two permit programs are often qualitatively different in how they
approach the Clean Water Act. Some of these differences are evident in the permit
programs themselves. For example, in Coeur Alaska, the Court had to decide which
permit program applied to Coeur Alaska’s discharge of a mine tailings slurry from
its Kensington Gold Mine into Slate Lake.330 “Over the life of the mine, Coeur
Alaska intend[ed] to put 4.5 million tons of tailings in the lake”331 at a rate of
210,000 gallons per day, effectively destroying the lake for the duration of the mine
and “kill[ing] all of the lake’s fish and nearly all of its other aquatic life.”332 This
result was perfectly legal under the Section 404 permit program, so long as Coeur
Alaska restored the lake at the end of the process and kept it isolated from other
waters in the interim—and, the Army Corps concluded, using Slate Lake this way
was better for the environment than disposing of the tailings in nearby wetlands.333
Under the NPDES program, in contrast, the discharge was completely illegal under
the EPA’s effluent limitations for the froth-floatation gold mining industry.334 The
Court’s six-Justice majority accorded Chevron deference to the Army Corps’ and
EPA’s decision that the Section 404 program applied because Coeur Alaska was
“filling” Slate Lake.335 Among other things, this decision makes clear that the Army
Corps’ founding instruction to promote commercial activity continues to conflict
with the EPA’s ca to protect the nation’s waters.
The Supreme Court’s View of the NPDES Permit Program: Protect the
Public Commons
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NPDES permits address classic water pollution by imposing “end of the pipe”
limitations (the effluent limitations) on how much or what concentration of
pollutants the polluter can discharge into the waterway,336 generally based on the
control technologies available to the polluter’s industrial category. As such,
NPDES permits condition how businesses can operate but, usually, not whether
they can exist. Moreover, the public benefits of the program are almost always easy
to explain. Navigable waterbodies have long been deemed a public resource that
should support navigation and fishing, and even privately owned smaller streams
flow into larger waters, making the externalities and public harms of traditional

330

557 U.S. 261, 267 (2009).
Id. at 268.
332
Id. at 297 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
333
Id. at 269-70. Forbidding the mine from damaging either water of the United States apparently
never occurred to the Army Corps.
334
Id. at 278-79 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b), 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1)).
335
Id. at 275, 277, 290-91. Along the way, the Court also deferred to the agencies’ conclusion that
the permit programs are mutually exclusive: any specific discharge is subject to one or the other,
but not both. Id. at 274-75.
336
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)
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water pollution fairly obvious even for these smaller waters. NPDES regulation
thus resonates strongly with common-law nuisance constraints on private action.337
In this regulatory context, the Supreme Court has long read the Act broadly to
effectuate Congress’s goal of reducing water pollution and to strengthen the EPA’s
authority to make progress toward that goal. For example, one of the Court’s
earliest NPDES decisions, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v, Train (1977),
emphasized that “[t]he statute, enacted on October 18, 1972, authorized a series of
steps to be taken to achieve the goal of eliminating all discharges of pollutants into
the Nation’s waters by 1985 … .”338 The issue was whether the EPA had authority
under the Act to issue industry-wide effluent limitations by regulation, as opposed
to setting facility-specific effluent limitations in the process of writing each
discharger’s permit.339 In upholding the EPA’s authority based on both the statutory
language and the legislative history,340 the Court also elaborated upon the
impediment that du Pont’s approach would pose to improving water quality:

pe

The petitioners’ view of the Act would place an impossible burden
on EPA. It would require EPA to give individual consideration to
the circumstances of each of the more than 42,000 dischargers who
have applied for permits, . . . and to issue or approve all these permits
well in advance of the 1977 deadline in order to give industry time
to install the necessary pollution-control equipment. We do not
believe that Congress would have failed so conspicuously to provide
EPA with the authority needed to achieve the statutory goals.341
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Similarly, in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association (1980), the Court upheld
the EPA’s decision not to allow variances from the first phase of effluent limitations
just because the discharger could not afford the “best practicable technology.”342
“Necessarily, if pollution is to be diminished, limitations based on BPT must forbid
the level of effluent produced by the most pollution-prone segment of the industry,
that segment not measuring up to ‘the average of the best existing performance.’
So understood, the statute contemplated regulations that would require a substantial

337
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Indeed, “In 1998, a Washington State court found that even lawful operation of a business—a
pulp mill operating with a Federal Water Pollution Control Act national pollution discharge
elimination system (NPDES) permit allowing it to discharge treated process wastewater into the
Columbia River—could support an award of $2.5 million in damages for nuisance to potato farmers
drawing irrigation water from the aquifer contaminated by the defendant’s operation.” Denise
Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10114, 10119 (2008) (citing Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877, 883 (Wash. 1998)).
338
430 U.S. 112, 116 (1977).
339
Id. at 125-26.
340
Id. at 129-32.
341
Id. at 132-33.
342
449 U.S. 64, 83-84 (1980).
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number of point sources with the poorest performances either to conform to BPT
standards or to cease production.”343
This trend continues into the Court’s most recent NPDES decision, County of
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund (2020), where the Court once again emphasized the
Act’s purpose to clean up the nation’s waterways.344 At issue was a sewage
treatment plant located north of Lahaina on the island of Maui, Hawai’i, and the
Court majority stressed the water quality problem that it was causing: “The facility
collects sewage from the surrounding area, partially treats it, and pumps the treated
water through four wells hundreds of feet underground. This effluent, amounting
to about 4 million gallons each day, then travels a further half mile or so, through
groundwater, to the ocean.”345 The issue was whether this conveyance through
groundwater constituted a discharge “from a point source” into the Pacific Ocean
that triggered the Act.346 The Court sought to find a middle ground between a broad
reading that would essentially require a permit regardless of how convoluted the
links between the discharger and the receiving “water of the United States” actually
were347 and a narrow reading that would create a “large and obvious loophole” in
the NPDES program any time pollutants passed through groundwater on their way
to a surface water body.348 As a result, the Court concluded that the facility could
be subject to the NPDES permit program if the injection was the “functional
equivalent of a direct discharge.”349
To be sure, some of the Court’s recent decisions also constrain the NPDES
program’s reach. However, these decisions tend to turn on complications other than
the Court’s own construction of the Act. For example, in Los Angeles County Flood
Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council (2013), the problem was a
badly framed issue on certiorari that turned a complex issue about Los Angeles
County’s ultimate responsibility for meeting water quality standards into an overly
simplistic issue of whether a discharge occurs when water flows from a channelized
portion of the Los Angeles River into a more natural portion;350 prior caselaw made
it clear that the answer was “no.”351 Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center (2013), in turn, turned on the Court giving Auer deference to the EPA’s
counterintuitive interpretation of its own regulation to conclude that logging roads
are not subject to the NPDES program’s stormwater requirements,352 an issue that

343

Id. at 76.
--- U.S. ---, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468, (2020) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
345
Id. at 1469.
346
Id. at 1470.
347
Id. at 1470-73.
348
Id. at 1473 (citations omitted).
349
Id. at 1476.
350
568 U.S. 78, 80 (2013).
351
Id. at 82-84. Notably, the Court’s decision was only six pages long.
352
568 U.S. 597, 612-14 (2013).
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put the NPDES program’s goal and the EPA’s authority to administer that program
squarely in conflict.353
3.

The Supreme Court’s View of “Waters of the United States” through the
Section 404 Permit Program: Protect State Prerogatives and Private
Property Rights
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The Section 404 permit program has moved far beyond Congress’s 1972 vision
of dredging and filling to maintain navigation. Consistent with Congress’s view
that Section 404 permits were mostly about navigation, the Army Corps’
regulations originally restricted “waters of the United States” to the traditionally
navigable waters.354 However, because the EPA eventually forced the Army Corps
to define “waters of the United States” to the limits of the Commerce Clause,355
Section 404 now requires permits for the dredging and filling of some subset of
smaller waters, including wetlands and small and intermittent streams. People who
now qualify for the Section 404 permit program are often ditching and/or filling the
soggier parts of their property before building something. Unlike NPDES permits,
therefore, Section 404 permits can and often do directly interfere with the
development of private property, particularly larger development projects.356 It is
no accident, in other words, that almost all constitutional takings litigation that the
Clean Water Act has generated comes out of the Section 404 permitting program.357
Moreover, wrangling over what uses can and cannot occur on private property
means that the Army Corps makes decisions in Section 404 permits that can look a
lot like land use planning, a traditional area of state authority.358
353
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See also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208. 217-27 (2009) (according Chevron
deference to the EPA’s decision to use cost-benefit analysis to determine the level of technological
stringency required for power plant cooling water intake structures, even though the standards
chosen were not the most protective of aquatic life).
354
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
355
See id. at 123-24 (recounting this history and citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 1975).
356
E.g.. Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that
the denial of the Section 404 permit ended development of cabins on a lakebed); Florida Rock
Industries v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990) (noting that a denial of a Section 404 permit
prevented a limestone mine from operating).
357
E.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126-29 (discounting the seriousness of the taking
issue as “spurious constitutional overtones”); Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (asserting a takings claim based on the Army Corps’ denial of a Section 404 permit);
Forest Properties, Inc. 177 F.3d at 1364 (asserting a regulatory takings claim on the basis of a
Section 404 permit denial); City National Bank of Miami v, United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 759 (1995)
(takings claim occasioned by denial of Section 404 permit). A corresponding Westlaw search for
takings claims in connection with the NPDEs program revealed no reported decisions.
358
E.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126 (virtually equating Section 404 permits with
land use planning); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (“Regulation of land use,
as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a
quintessential state and local power.” (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767–768, n. 30
(1982); Hess v. Port Authority Trans–Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994))).
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Thus, litigation over the Section 404 permit program has shifted the Court’s
attention away from improving water quality and safeguarding the EPA’s authority
to protecting private property rights and states’ traditional authorities. In the
process, this litigation has also focused on the scope of “waters of the United
States,” eventually creating a definitional mess that now limits the NPDES
program, as well.
Indeed, in the Supreme Court, the controversy over the proper definition of
“waters of the United States” has played out entirely in the Section 404 context.
The first decision, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (1985),359 felt
much like the NPDES decisions: the Court unanimously held that the Army Corps
can regulate the dredging and filling of wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable
bodies of water, in order to fulfill the Act’s water quality goals.360 The defendant,
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., owned 80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near
the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan. In 1976, it began to fill
these wetlands to build a housing development. Giving Chevron deference to the
Army Corps’ regulations interpreting “waters of the United States,” the Riverside
Bayview Court concluded that applying the Clean Water Act to “adjacent wetlands”
made sense, because “the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection
of water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps
to interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more
conventionally defined.”361 Moreover, the Court conceived of “waters of the United
States” as significantly broader than the traditional navigable waters:
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Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly.
Although the Act prohibits discharges into “navigable waters,” …
the Act’s definition of “navigable waters” as “the waters of the
United States” makes it clear that the term “navigable” as used in
the Act is of limited import. In adopting this definition of “navigable
waters,” Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had
been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control
statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to
regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed “navigable”
under the classical understanding of that term.362

ep

Nevertheless, in a footnote, the Riverside Bayview Court also specified that “[w]e
are not called upon to address the question of the authority of the Corps to regulate
discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water
… and we do not express any opinion on that question.”363
359

474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Id. at 132-33.
361
Id. at 130–31.
362
Id. at 133 (citations to statute omitted).
363
Id. at 131–32 n.8. The Court’s 2002 decision in Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers also technically upheld Section 404 jurisdiction over “deep ripping” of wetlands at a
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In 1986, the Army Corps revised its regulations. In the preamble to those
revisions—but not in the regulations themselves—the Corps noted that it would
assert Clean Water Act jurisdiction over any intrastate waters:
Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
(ii) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines; or
(iii) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species;
or
(iv) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.364

ev

(i)
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These non-regulatory assertions of jurisdiction became known, collectively, as the
“Migratory Bird Rule.” The Migratory Bird Rule led directly to the Supreme
Court’s 2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers,365 better known as SWANCC. SWANCC involved an
abandoned sand and gravel mining site that 23 cities and villages in suburban
Chicago wanted to convert to a sanitary landfill. Several of the abandoned gravel
pits had filled with water, and, while the Army Corps did not consider them
wetlands, over 121 species of birds used the ponds, including migratory birds.366
The Army Corps asserted jurisdiction over the site on the basis of the Migratory
Bird Rule and denied SWANCC a Section 404 permit to fill the ponds.367 When
SWANCC appealed, the Supreme Court held, 5–4, that the Army Corps and EPA
could not use the Migratory Bird Rule to regulate intrastate, isolated waters.368
Along the way, moreover, the majority emphasized that:
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We cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use of the
phrase “waters of the United States” constitutes a basis for reading
the term “navigable waters” out of the statute. … The term
“navigable” has at least the import of showing us what Congress had
in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or
which could reasonably be so made.369
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vineyard, but the 4-4 split among the Justices merely affirmed the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the
Ninth Circuit as a default, and the entire opinion consists of two sentences: “The judgment is
affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.” 537 U.S. 99, 100 (2002).
364
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217
(Nov. 13, 1986)
365
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
366
Id. at 164-65.
367
Id. at 165.
368
Id. at 174.
369
Id. at 171-72 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407–408
(1940)).
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The SWANCC majority also refused to defer to the Army Corps’ regulatory
definition of “waters of the United States.”370 It emphasized, for example, that
“Congress chose to ‘recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of
land and water resources … .’”371 The Army Corps’ regulations raised “significant
constitutional questions” of federalism, and allowing the agency “to claim federal
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’
would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary
power over land and water use.”372
Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the five-Justice majority did not
even acknowledge the NPDES program. Perhaps more surprisingly, Justice
Stevens’ opinion for the dissenters is similarly myopic. It does start with a broad
vision of the Act, noting that “[a]lthough Congress’ vision of zero pollution remains
unfulfilled, its pursuit has unquestionably retarded the destruction of the aquatic
environment. Our Nation's waters no longer burn. Today, however, the Court takes
an unfortunate step that needlessly weakens our principal safeguard against toxic
water.”373 From there, however, the dissenters focus exclusively on Section 404,
including its differences from the Rivers and Harbors Act,374 why the Army Corps
changed its mind about the scope of “waters of the United States,”375 and how
Section 404 does indeed respect state authority376 and does not infringe upon the
Commerce Clause’s scope.377 Caught up in the property and federalism drama of
Section 404, the Court apparently simply forgot about the implications of its
decision for the NPDES program.
Rapanos v. United States (2006)378 fractured the Supreme Court, and there has
been no national unity regarding “waters of the United States” ever since. As the
plurality of four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, described the facts, John
Rapanos backfilled wetlands to develop a parcel of private property in Michigan
that “included 54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated soil conditions,” although
“[t]he nearest navigable water was 11 to 20 miles away.”379 From there, the
plurality opinion is a rant against the Army Corp’s intrusion into private property
rights and state land use planning, worth reproducing fully:
370
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Id. at 168 (noting that “the Corps’ original interpretation of the CWA, promulgated two years
after its enactment, is inconsistent with that which it espouses here”), 172 (explicitly refusing to
extend Chevron deference).
371
Id. at 166-67 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
372
Id. at 174.
373
Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
374
Id. at 179-182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
375
Id. at 183-191 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
376
Id. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
377
Id. at 192-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
378
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
379
Id. at 719-21.

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793991

ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG

Spring

iew
ed

64

Pr

ep

rin

tn

ot

pe

er
r

ev

The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill
material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is
not trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an
enlightened despot, relying on such factors as “economics,”
“aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general, the needs and welfare of
the people,” 33 CFR § 320.4(a) (2004). The average applicant for
an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing
the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit
spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or
design changes. … “[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the
private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.” These costs
cannot be avoided, because the Clean Water Act “impose[s]
criminal liability,” as well as steep civil fines, “on a broad range of
ordinary industrial and commercial activities.” … In this litigation,
for example, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced
63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal
and civil fines.
The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small
part of the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that
has occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any change in the
governing statute—during the past five Presidential administrations.
In the last three decades, the Corps and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) have interpreted their jurisdiction over
“the waters of the United States” to cover 270–to–300 million acres
of swampy lands in the United States—including half of Alaska and
an area the size of California in the lower 48 States. And that was
just the beginning. The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over
virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit—
whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or
ephemeral—through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally
or intermittently flow. On this view, the federally regulated “waters
of the United States” include storm drains, roadside ditches, ripples
of sand in the desert that may contain water once a year, and lands
that are covered by floodwaters once every 100 years. Because they
include the land containing storm sewers and desert washes, the
statutory “waters of the United States” engulf entire cities and
immense arid wastelands. In fact, the entire land area of the United
States lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible
channels furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally
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wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land containing such a channel
may potentially be regulated as a “water of the United States.”380
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Moreover, “[t]he extensive federal jurisdiction urged by the Government would
authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of
intrastate land—an authority the agency has shown its willingness to exercise with
the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning board.”381
To correct this unwarranted and possibly unconstitutional expansion of federal
power, the plurality focused on the meaning of “waters,” concluding that:
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“the waters of the United States” include only relatively permanent,
standing or flowing bodies of water. The definition refers to water
as found in “streams,” “oceans,” “rivers,” “lakes,” and “bodies” of
water “forming geographical features.” All of these terms connote
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily
dry channels through which water occasionally or intermittently
flows. Even the least substantial of the definition’s terms, namely,
“streams,” connotes a continuous flow of water in a permanent
channel—especially when used in company with other terms such
as “rivers,” “lakes,” and “oceans.” None of these terms encompasses
transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of water.382
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This time, however, the federal government and various amici put the NPDES
problem squarely in front of the Court, arguing that the plurality’s interpretation
would allow polluters to evade the NPDES permit requirement, as well.383 The
plurality disagreed, arguing that NPDEs discharges to not have to reach “waters of
the United States directly, “that the discharge into intermittent channels of any
pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if the
pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters,
but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between,” and that the intermittent conveyances
might themselves qualify as point sources.384 In this respect, the plurality
concluded, there were important differences between dredged and fill material and
other pollutants:

ep

In contrast to the pollutants normally covered by the [NPDES]
permitting requirement of § 1342(a), “dredged or fill material,”
which is typically deposited for the sole purpose of staying put, does
not normally wash downstream, and thus does not normally

380

Id. at 721-22 (citations omitted).
Id. at 738.
382
Id. at 732-33.
383
Id. at 742-43.
384
Id. at 743-44.
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constitute an “addition ... to navigable waters” when deposited in
upstream isolated wetlands. … It does not appear, therefore, that the
interpretation we adopt today significantly reduces the scope of §
1342.385
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One can speculate whether the plurality Justices had ever actually observed
dredging and filling operations.386 Nevertheless, regardless of how one judges the
sincerity of their attempt to distinguish the NPDES program, it is clear that concerns
about the NPDES program were not going to alter their decision to constrain
Section 404. These Justices’ regulatory focus had thus shifted decisively from
promoting continued progress in reducing water pollution to reining in Section
404’s alleged overreaching.
Neither Justice Kennedy in concurrence nor the dissenters agreed that the
plurality had arrived at the correct test for “waters of the United States.” Justice
Kennedy harkened back to Riverside Bayview to emphasize hydrological
connectivity, and under his test “the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends
upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and
navigable waters in the traditional sense.”387 Moreover, “wetlands possess the
requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the
wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”388 The four dissenting Justices, in
an opinion by Justice Stevens, would have maintained broad jurisdiction over
wetlands and other waters but—recognizing that lower courts now had two other
tests to decide between—concluded that a “water of the United States” existed if
either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test was met.389
Since Rapanos, there has been no agreement what to do about the definition of
“waters of the United States.” Proposed amendments in Congress failed,390 and the
U.S. Courts of Appeals maintain a circuit split over whether to use the dissenter’s
“either/or” approach or whether Justice Kennedy’s test controls; none use only the
plurality test.391 Each of the Obama and Trump Administrations promulgated
“waters of the United States” regulations that were promptly challenged in multiple
courts,392 and at one point in 2020, both sets of regulations, as well as the EPA’s
385

Id. at 744-45.
Notably, both Justice Kennedy and the dissenters questioned the factual accuracy of the
plurality’s assertion that dredged and fill material stays in place. Id. at 774-75 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), 806-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
387
Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
388
Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
389
Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
390
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS XX (5th ed.
forthcoming 2021).
391
Id. at XX.
392
For a summary of the reactions to the 2015 Obama Administration Clean Water Rule, see Dave
Owens, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2-3.
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and Army Corps’ pre-Rapanos regulations, were being challenged in litigation,
with confusion and cross-injunctions escalating to the point where not even the
EPA was sure which regulations applied in New Mexico.393 It is expected that the
Biden Administration will formally withdraw the Trump Administration’s
regulations and return for a time to the post-Rapanos circuit split before proposing
new “waters of the United States” regulations of its own.394 Inevitably, regardless
of what they say, court challenges will follow.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has continued to pursue a pro-property owner
agenda in cases involving Section 404. Both Sackett v. Environmental Protection
Agency (2012)395 and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. (2016)396
involved the right of property owners to immediately challenge the Army Corps’
and EPA’s determinations that the Clean Water Act applies to wetlands and other
waters on their properties. In Sackett, the Sacketts filled in part of their Idaho lot in
order to build a house, only to receive an EPA compliance order concluding that
they were filling jurisdictional wetlands and requiring them to restore the
property.397 The Court unanimously concluded that the compliance order was “final
agency action” subject to immediate judicial review.398 Justice Alito concurred to
emphasize that “[t]he position taken in this case by the Federal Government—a
position that the Court now squarely rejects—would have put the property rights of
ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) employees.”399
In Hawkes, Hawkes Co. was engaged in mining peat from bogs that the Army
Corps concluded were subject to the Clean Water Act, and Hawkes Co. wanted to
challenge that determination before actually going through the permitting process.
All nine Justices again concurred that an Army Corps jurisdictional determination
is “final agency action”400 subject to judicial review. However, for Chief Justice
Roberts—in an opinion eight Justices joined in full—the stakes in the Section 404
context were particularly high and worth laying out in detail, and he quoted at
length the plurality opinion in Rapanos regarding the costs and extensive
jurisdiction of Section 404 permits.401 Together, therefore, Sackett and Hawkes
evidence a clear Supreme Court determination to ensure that private property
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CRAIG, ELIC, supra note 390 at XX; see also Congressional Research Service, Evolution of the
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566 U.S. 120 (2012).
396
--- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
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Sackett, 566 U.S. at 123-25.
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Id. at 131.
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Id. at 132 (Alito, J., concurring).
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owners can have their day in court before the Clean Water Act can limit how they
develop their land.
D. What Lessons Does the Regulatory Shifting Baseline Syndrome Offer for
the Clean Water Act?
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As the Congressional Research Service recognized in 2019, “During the first
two decades after the passage of the Clean Water Act, courts generally interpreted
the act as having a wide jurisdictional reach.”402 During this 20-year period, the
Supreme Court focused exclusively on the NPDES program, generally upholding
the EPA’s authority “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The EPA and the courts got the NPDES program
up and running, and Congress has not changed that program significantly since the
1987 amendments that required permits for municipal and industrial stormwater
discharges.403
It worked. Rivers no longer burn and, for the most part, cities no longer
discharge raw sewage into the nation’s waterways.404 Water quality nationwide has
gotten better.405 Supreme Court attention has shifted to Section 404, and it “has
emphasized that ‘the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause,
though broad, is not unlimited.’”406
Regardless of what the Rapanos plurality may have intended, the Rapanos
problematization of “waters of the United States” spilled into the NPDES context,
absolving multiple polluters of the obligation to get a Clean Water Act permit.407
Thus, in shifting the relevant regulatory baseline from NPDES program’s control
over paradigmatic municipal and industrial dischargers to Section 404’s impact on
private landowners and state land use planning federalism prerogatives, a majority
of Justices are in fact suffering from a form of the regulatory shifting baseline
syndrome—a discounting of the danger to continuing progress in improving the
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nation’s water quality resulting from the fact that Section 404 raises completely
different issues.
Here, however, there is no single restorative solution. Instead, the dramatic
differences in Supreme Court views of the Clean Water Act’s breadth depending
on permit context illuminates a structural weakness in the Act overall: Despite the
fact that Congress initially conceived the two permit programs as performing very
different functions, it yoked them together interpretatively through a single
statutory trigger and set of definitions. Rather than continuing the frustrating efforts
to draft a single set of “waters of the United States” regulations that serve both
regulatory programs, water quality would benefit tremendously from a complete
separation of the two programs. The Supreme Court may have created enough of
an interpretive loophole that would allow the EPA and Army Corps to achieve this
separation themselves,408 but a congressional amendment would be cleaner and less
susceptible to ongoing litigation. As a bonus, clear separation of the two permit
programs could also prove a boon to building political momentum to finally extend
the Clean Water Act to the NPDES-like water pollution that agricultural creates—
return flows from irrigation and channelized agricultural stormwater, long exempt
from regulation409—without even the hint of a threat to farmers’ day-to-day
activities, which has formed the basis of the American Farm Bureau’s strong (if not
always legally accurate) opposition to the “waters of the United States”
regulations.410
V. CONCLUSION
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Protecting ourselves from ourselves is one of the trickiest purposes of public
law. Nevertheless, in numerous contexts, generational amnesia has allowed the
public, courts, regulatory agencies, politicians, and legislatures to embrace the
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, allowing history to repeat itself.
If one accepts that the shifting baseline syndrome is a real phenomenon with
real consequences that generally impoverish society as a whole—whether through
a degraded natural resource base, loss of global economic stability, or increased
threats to public health—the question then becomes how to prevent, or at least
correct for, its emergence. The loss of intergeneration memory about historical
ecological conditions—“environmental generational amnesia”411—may require
active reconstruction of cultural memory through new sources of data and creative
extrapolation. For the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, however, the cultural
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memory is right there—embodied in the very regulatory regime whose success
allows the syndrome to emerge.
More information, in other words, is unlikely to be a necessary or effective
corrective to the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. Instead, the various
regulatory gatekeepers—members of legislatures, agency personnel, presidents and
governors, and judges—need institutional prods to remind them to remember and
to value the cultural memory they retrieve. For constitutional and other reasons,
these institutional prods will largely need to function as norms rather than as
requirements. Nevertheless, institutional norms, once developed, can still be
powerful. As one example, when FDR broke the two-term presidential norm that
George Washington established, the result was a constitutional amendment to
ensure that no President ever did it again.412
The first step in correcting the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome is
deceptively simple: A broad swath of society must identify regulatory regimes as
memory institutions. When interest groups or even a large percentage of the
population challenge a longstanding public regulatory regime as outdated and
obstructionist, the first response should become: “Why does it exist in the first
place? What problem might we resurrect if this regime goes away?”
Again, the point is not that longstanding public regulatory regimes cannot
outlive their usefulness; they most certainly can. The point, rather, is that
legislatures and agencies created them for a reason—a reason that was worth the
effort and expense of putting the new regime into place. Particularly when the
industries and interest groups that propose dismantling the regime argue in favor of
the private benefits that will result—more profit, greater property rights, even (in
the right circumstances) greater individual freedom and states’ rights—a high
threshold of skepticism and a presumption in favor of continuing to protect the
general public welfare is warranted.
The second step is to reconstitute the full risk-benefit balancing at issue. At
the very least, regulatory gatekeepers should understand the full range of societal
problems at stake before they attempt to re-evaluate the regulatory regime for
contemporary circumstances. The temptation in light of immediate political
pressure is to discount the vanquished regulatory problem as irrelevant—to shift
the regulatory baseline. Therefore, to ensure that this impulse is not in fact the
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, legislatures and courts should assess the
extent to which the public is still benefitting from the regulatory regime—even if
the problem itself has not been seen for decades. Will certain states create
discriminatory voting regimes in the absence of federal oversight? Both historical
and contemporary evidence clearly indicate that they will. Will the economy crash
again if we let the financial industries do what they want? All available evidence
says yes. Will infectious diseases return to the United States if we stop vaccinating
and allow herd immunity to lapse? Again, with the exception of completely or
geographically eradicated diseases like smallpox and polio, all available evidence
412

U.S. Const., amend. 22 (passed by Congress March 21, 1947, ratified Feb. 27, 1951).
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says yes. Will industries protect waterways in the absence of effective regulation?
History says no.
We should listen to history.
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